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The act of representation is, to an extent, a sine qua non condition within the artistic process and 
always acquires its meaning in relation to a presence. Presence acts as an internal or external 
stimulus, and re-presentation is the effect of a presence. From this perspective, I have examined the 
work of Francis Bacon, Susan Hiller, Giorgio Morandi, Gerhard Richter, Iannis Xenakis, and, 
among others, the theories of Giorgio Agamben, Benjamin Buchloch, Daniel Chandler, Gilles 
Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Hal Foster and Henri Lefebvre. 
Within the frame of this enquiry, I have created a series of polyptychs exploring different 
possibilities, correlations and aspects of my topic. The internal or external stimulus for the creation 
of these series varies: from recorded video stills of London’s urban scenery to a one-wave loop 
videotaped at a Greek coast, and from a specific architectural site to various landscapes – all painted 
in situ or from photographs. Although this variety calls for dissimilar creative strategies for each 
polyptych, all of them are connected with each other, as they share the following properties: 
• the openness, which practically relativizes the beginning and the end of the artwork, the part 
and the whole, the real space–time and the imagery space–time,
• the rhythm (practically, its simplified form is repetition), as the element that makes the 
synthesis and unification of different states of presence possible – through the function of 
consonance,
• the pictorial language (i.e., colour, line, shape, etc.), as the intermediate between the individual 
and the collective evaluation of the artwork. 
In the context of my semisite-specific practice, I reactivate the notion of topicality  to approximate 
the foundation of a stable and real ground where the artwork forms and develops. By exploring the 
act of representation, I discuss the poetic metaphor from and to the real, the constitution of the real 
and its consequences on how we value art.
I argue that, both practically and theoretically, rhythm is identified through the principle of 
presence, and I examine rhythm as the methodological tool whose vibration penetrates practical 
experimentation and whose contents are susceptible to theoretical exploration. Odysseas Elytis’ 
poem eloquently describes the experience that artists relish during the creative process – the poetic 
point of view. By the same token, art practice repulses a well established methodology, thus 
maintaining an entropy, or an openness. I put forward the hypothesis that rhythm can offer a 
sustainable methodological tool for art practice-based areas of study.
In my research, I explore the structure and limits of visual/pictorial language, that are 
simultaneously  historical and physical. Practically, this exploration is correlated with a quest for the 
proper (proportion, colour, gesture, etc.) within my compositions – i.e., a search on artistic 
manipulation and its criteria of evalutation.
Finally, I investigate the theoretical context of Presence and Representation, its relation to the real 
and how different comprehensions correspond with and influence different viewpoints and theses, 
which, in turn, have personal and social consequences. As Daniel Chandler (1994) indicates, it is 
unavoidable to ask ‘whose realities are privileged in particular representations’, a recognition which 
eschews a retreat to mere subjectivism, as it  ‘pays due tribute to the unequal distribution of power 
in the social world.’
Before the ridge of Serifos, as the sun rises, the guns of all the 
great world theories fall silent. The mind is overcome by a few 
waves and some rocks; absurd perhaps but nevertheless sufficient 
to reveal man in his true dimensions. 
–O. Elytis, Carte blanche, trans. by David ConnollyINTRODUCTION
1. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
PREVIOUS EDUCATIONAL AND CREATIVE PRACTICE
1996-2003, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, BA painting.
2004-2008, Athens School of Fine Arts, BA sculpture.
2008-2009, Wimbledon College of Art, MA Fine Art: painting.
1.1. BA in Painting creative practice and theory
During both BA courses I engaged into a 
thorough exploration and study of the pictorial 
language and space. This exploration took 
place through the physical observation of the 
human figure and its surrounding space as it is 
interpreted, manipulated and transited in the 
pictorial space of the painting. The content 
and subject matter of my paintings was to be 
explored, negotiated and discovered through 
the process – or, better still, is this process 
itself. 
This exploration would be based on colour 
and form, i.e., the pictorial vocabulary, and 
the relations and dynamics it  formed within 
the context of the surrounding pictorial 
elements. During the representational process 
of the observed human figure, an elaboration 
o f t h i s k i n d ( i . e . , t h e c o n t i n u o u s 
rearrangement of colour and form) had 
simultaneously  and unavoidably  an element of 
abstraction, as well as an element of 
figuration.
The development of my paintings had an organic character, as I would realize multiple readings of 
every  part  of the painting day after day, rearranging several times the form in relation to the 
continuously changing context of plastic relations in the flow of time. This process would give to 
the painting the essence of a palimpsest and a materiality that  was the result of the insertion of 
multiple spaces and times in the same work, through its organic development.
Furthermore, even though the work had a relation/affinity to reality, it would simultaneously  stand 
and bear a reality  of its own, because of the interpretation of the artist and the obvious presence of 
the materials.
Figure 1
Untitled, 2003, oil on canvas, 180 x 120 cm 
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1.2. BA in Sculpture creative practice and theory
After finishing my BA in painting, I continued my studies in the field of sculpture. My studies in 
sculpture included works made of clay from observation of a model, then cast in plaster.
In painting I had already detected physicality caused by the way  I was applying or removing the 
paint on the canvas and a tension for solid structural composition. Especially during the last period 
of my BA painting studies I had become particularly preoccupied with the limits of the canvas, the 
edges [the limits] of the pictorial space and the way they affect and are affected by the overall 
composition of the painting. 
These preoccupations led me to expand my studies 
from the two-dimensional space of painting to the 
three-dimensional space of sculpture, that has, from 
its base, a physical character because of the gravity 
of its materials as well as its realization in the form 
of an object. 
Through sculpture I could study issues of the plastic 
language that  exist in painting as well, but in a more 
“mild” and hidden form. Such issues are the full and 
the void, the relation between the figurated space as 
matter, in the case of the sculptural figure, and as air/
void, in the case of its surrounding space, the 
presence and the absence, the elements of the 
positive and the negative space/form. 
Additionally, through sculpture I could better 
explore the multiple aspects of view and the rhythm 
and movement that such a viewing produces in time. 
My exploration on these issues was realized in three 
dimensional figurative sculptures (see Appendix: 
Image 5) and concluded in the form of reliefs, that 
had an affinity with the two dimensional nature of 
painting (see Figure 2).
1.3. MA creative practice and theory
The central question which I explored during my MA research was the relation between the actual/
preexisting space–time and the pictorial space–time. I initially started experimenting with an 
installation that combined different materials, some preexisting and rough and others fabricated and 
made by me: painting with oil colour, sculpting and curving on wooden boards nailed with actual 
nails on the wall, and a rough tree trunk on the floor whose shape corresponded to the composition 
and rhythm of the artifact on the wall (see Appendix: Images 7-10). 
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Figure 2
Untitled, 2006, clay, 50 x 35 x 5 cm
Figure 3
Polyptych I, 2008, oil paint and carving on wood, tree trunk, nails, 200 x 180 x 100 cm
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The plastic gesture of combining a tree trunk as a preexisting piece of nature with the man-made 
elements initiated a dialogue between the actual preexisting elements and the pictorial elements. 
The form of the work deliberately  remained open, as a continuous transposition from the one 
element to the other occurred. 
In this work (see Figure 3), even though there was a dialogue between the essences of the 
preexisting and the pictorial, the pictorial space was not realized through the observation of a theme 
taken from the actual space. So the question of the relation between the actual/preexisting space and 
the pictorial space was not put as cogently as it could if the pictorial space had representational 
character.
For this reason, in order to reexamine the function of interpretation when creating a pictorial space 
through observation of reality, in a following painting I tried to make a self-sufficient  painting (see 
Figure 4) protected and limited by a wooden frame that I cut and painted for this purpose. Thus, this 
sculptural element and its heavier material was restricted and restricting the edges of the pictorial 
space.
            
The question on the relation between the actual and 
the pictorial space was more decisively addressed at 
the work presented for the MA final examination, in 
which I integrated architectural elements with 
sculptural and pictorial ones (see Figures 5, 6, 
Appendix: Images 12-18).
In this installation called Polyptych II (where the 
preexisting space was a constitutive element of the 
total work presented) I realized an intense study  of the 
constant dialogue that occurs when painting from 
observation between the actual and the pictorial 
elements. I explored how each of them affects the 
experience, perception and meaning of the other, as 
well as the spectrum of transformations from the one 
condition to the other.
I worked in a large scale and initially adopted the materials and ways by which the existing 
architectural space was constructed. After a preparatory architectural drawing of the space, that I 
made in situ (see Appendix: Image 12), I placed six mdf white primed panels (in two groups of 
three) of dimensions 2m x 1m x 9mm with screws on two preexisting opposite white walls made as 
well from mdf panels. This first  gesture was at the edge of being a gesture, as the nature of its 
outcome was very close to the nature of the preexisting space, but it was also an intervention in 
order to balance the structure of the space. In this way, the compositional process was manifest as a 
pursuit of balance that had to be regained in the work that would occupy the surface of three of the 
six white panels. On them I represented the existing space and myself (while observing and painting 
this space by  standing at its center) as I observed them both directly and through the reflection on a 
mirror. The three primed panels were acting as an anchor to the three painted, carved and cut ones at 
the other side of the space, as they constituted the transitional point from the preexisting actual 
space to the pictorial one, and vice versa (see Appendix: Images 13, 14). In addition, the insertion of 
sculptural applications in the pictorial space, i.e., the carving, the cuttings and the use of screws to 
Figure 4
Untitled, 2009, oil paint on canvas and wood, 
30.5 x 30.5 cm 
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attach the pieces on the wall, as they naturally contain characteristics of the actual space (for 
example, more apparent materiality, the full and the void, three dimensions), they also constitute a 
transitional condition between the two spaces (see Appendix: Images 15-18).
In this process of painting/sculpting from observation and considering the surrounding space under 
observation as a constitutive element of the total work, the created/painted space gradually becomes 
perceived as part of the observed space itself, strengthening the relationship and the dialogue 
between the actual/objective and the created/subjective space. Furthermore, the spectrum of 
relations created between the two conditions and their meanings, were to be intensively  experienced 
by the viewer as well, as the nature of the installation allows the viewer to become immersed in 
space, to confront and reflect in the flow of time on the reality of things.     
Figure 5
Polyptych II, 2009, oil paint acrylic primer and carving on mdf wood, screws, 300 cm x 200 cm x 9 mm (x 2)
Figure 6
Polyptych II, 2009, oil paint, acrylic primer, carving on mdf wood, screws, 300 cm x 200 cm x 9 mm
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In this process of painting/sculpting from observation, and considering the surrounding space under 
observation as a constitutive element of the total work, the created/painted space gradually becomes 
perceived as part of the observed space itself, strengthening the relationship and the dialogue 
between the actual/objective and the created/subjective space. Furthermore, the spectrum of 
relations created between the two conditions and their meanings, were to be intensively  experienced 
by the viewer as well, as the nature of installation allows the viewer to become immersed in space, 
to confront and reflect in the flow of time on the reality of things.     
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2. ARTISTS AND THEORISTS
Francis Bacon, Gerhard Richter and Giorgio Morandi follow different representational processes. I 
have chosen these specific three artists because each of them has developed his own approach to 
representation in relation to presence and the notion of the real. They all overcome the antithesis 
between abstraction and figuration, and renegotiate and question our perception and constitution of 
the real. In the framework of this enquiry, I also make reference to the works of Iannis Xenakis and 
Susan Hiller, and to the related theories of Gilles Deleuze, Hal Foster, Henri Lefebvre and Benjamin 
Buchloch. Furthermore, in the theoretical context section I discuss in depth the issues of pictorial/
visual language and rhythm, which are essential in the context of Presence and Representation and 
the grounding of my research. My estimation is that the reference to some of the ideas of Daniel 
Chandler, Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben will cast new light to the artworks, clarify  key 
concepts and offer a different perspective to the present examination.   
2.1. Francis Bacon and Gilles Deleuze
2.1.1. Sensation and the figural
A first important issue that interests me in Bacon is the fact that, 
despite the distortions and the physical presence of the paint, his 
work is not abstract, as there is always a recognizable figure, or – in 
Bacon’s terminology – a fact  that is recorded (Sylvester, 1975, p. 
58). But his work is neither illustrative or narrative, because of the 
way that this fact is visualized and modulated. A figure is 
readdressed not through an illustration but through a notion opposite 
to illustration, i.e., its distortion (see Figure 7). This is what Deleuze 
(2008, p. 2) presents as the opposition of the “figural” to the 
“figurative”.
Bacon explains this opposition: ‘the difference is that an illustrational [figurative] form tells you 
through the intelligence immediately what the form is about, whereas a non-illustrational [figural] 
form works first  upon sensation and then slowly leaks back into the fact’ (Sylvester, 1975, p. 56). 
Sensation from which the way of the non-illustrational, the non-figurative, the way of the figure 
derives is thoroughly presented by Deleuze (2008, p. 25): 
Sensation has one face turned towards the subject  (the nervous 
system, vital movement, “instinct”, temperament…) and one face 
turned toward the object (the fact, the place, the event). Or rather 
[…] it  is both things indissolubly, it is Being-in-the-World, as 
phenomenologists say: at one and the same time I become in the 
sensation and something happens through the sensation, one through 
the other, one in the other. 
Figure 7
Self-portrait, 1971, 
oil on canvas, 35.5 x 30.5 cm
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2.1.2. Chance in Bacon’s method
Bacon manages to activate sensation, achieve the figural (=the way of the figure) and overcome the 
figurative/illustrational. He does this by inserting “chance” in his method. Trying to put aside all his 
preconceptions and figurative givens, his first marks and strokes on the canvas are accidental. For 
him, figure is the improbable itself and ‘this manipulated chance [is] opposed to conceived or seen 
probabilities. […] A probable visual whole (first figuration) has been disorganized and deformed by 
free manual traits which, by  being reinjected into the whole, will produce the improbable visual 
figure (second figuration)’ (Deleuze, 2008, p. 66). By his method, apart from the illustrational, he 
overcomes pure abstraction as well.
2.1.3. Rhythm
Bacon’s system and method elaborate three simultaneous elements of painting, that  can be clarified/
described with the help  of sculptural terminology (Deleuze, 2008, p. 4), which I find very 
interesting as I constantly reflect on the dialogue between painting and sculpture:
• the armature or material structure (bone),
• the pedestal or contour (mobile),
• the figure (flesh). 
On top of the structure, the contour and the figural forces take place. Systolic movements that come 
from the structure pressure the figure and at the same time diastolic ones go the opposite direction. 
The contour between them assures the communication among them. The coexistence of all these 
forces and movements produce the rhythm, that is the vital power of sensation (Deleuze, 2008, p. 
30) (see Figure 8).
‘Force is closely  related to sensation: For a sensation to exist, a force must be exerted on a body, on 
a point of the wave’ (Deleuze, 2008, p. 40). The primary  function of the figures in Bacon’s work is, 
exactly, to make invisible forces (like pressure, inertia, weight, attraction, gravitation, germination) 
visible, and ‘it  is the rhythm itself that would become the figure, that would constitute the 
figure’ (Deleuze, 2008, p. 50).
Figure 8
Sweeney Agonistes, 1967, 146.5 x 198 cm
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Empirically, in Bacon’s work we perceive three rhythms: ‘[…] an “active” rhythm, with an 
increasing variation or amplification, then a “passive” rhythm, with a decreasing variation or 
elimination, and, finally, the attendant rhythm’, i.e., the constant one. Pictorially, we usually 
recognize the first two as verticals in a descending–rising opposition, a diastolic–systolic 
opposition, a naked–clothed opposition and an augmentation–diminution opposition, and the 
attendant rhythm as horizontal, which ‘defines a rhythm that is retrogradable in itself, thus without 
increase or decrease’ (Deleuze, 2008, p. 54).
The importance of this Deleuzean examination lies in the fact that it closely relates theory  with 
practice. The analysis of Bacon’s artwork and his process reflects on my preoccupation with the 
presence of the figure in painting and on my interest in the figural, as opposed to the figurative, that 
is organically related with the making process of the work and the wider notion of rhythm as an 
essential element of the nature of the artwork.  
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2.2. Gerhard Richter and Hal Foster
My interest in Gerhard Richter’s contemporary painting lies in the use of photography as vital 
research material and in the opposition of the elements of abstraction and representation in his 
work.
Richter accepts the dominance of photography in contemporary  reality. ‘Photographs are almost 
nature,’ he notes (2005, p. 187). Hal Foster poses the question if this dependence suggests that ‘our 
very sensorium, memory and unconscious have become, at least in part, “photogenic” in 
semblance’ (Foster, 2003, p. 123). Has our modern world a photographic and digital face? Richter 
depends on photography as a source material, but reflects on the above question in his painting 
through the opposition between representation and abstraction throughout his work. 
It is very interesting for me how he manages to produce ‘a piercing referentiality out of flimsy 
representation’ (Foster, 2003, p. 127). That is the point where the contradictions that appear in his 
work meet, and a third factor/condition is produced, that finds its place between representation and 
its destruction, between the manipulation of resemblance of appearance and apprehension of 
appearance. This condition is expressed mainly by the effect of blurring.
A series of works entitled Mother with Child, indicative 
of these contradictions, were made in 1995 (see Figure 
9). As he says (2005, p. 226), ‘Something had to be 
shown and simultaneously not shown’, and the 
blurriness helps ‘in order perhaps to say something else 
again, a third thing.’ 
For Richter (2005, p. 227), ‘the picture is the depiction, 
and painting is the technique for shattering it.’ Which is 
to say  that ‘photography delivers a resemblance (it 
merely “sees” objects) that the painting can – indeed, for 
Richter must – open up so that  semblance might be 
revealed, “apprehended”’ (Foster, 2003, p. 127). ‘In this 
sense, semblance is less appearance than our 
apprehension of appearance, it is about human 
perception, embodiment, and agency  – not as they are for 
all time but precisely as they are altered by  social change 
and technological transformation’ (Foster, 2003, p. 126).
The accumulation of photographs in the contemporary  world is said to be an attempt to banish the 
recollection of death. But Baudrilliard (1998, p. 236) believes the truth is that the object of 
photography  ‘becomes the site of absence and disappearance of the subject.’ Given all this, the 
hypothesis that Richter paints from photography and depicts it through the blurring technique ‘to 
reveal the deathliness of this photographic face [of the world] and to render the photographic 
mnemonic in painting, as painting’ (Foster, 2003, p. 120) can be valid.
It can be said that in Richter’s work recognition and disavowal, exposure and concealment meet, 
and the reconciliation of the opposites can be found in the “shiny blurs” which, as Foster puts it 
(2003, p.131) ‘reflect on the vicissitudes of the Shein (= light in Germain) in modern times.’ 
Figure 1
Images used for the composition of Untitled 2010
Figure 9
Mother with child, 1995,
oil on canvas, 36 x 51 cm
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2.3. Representation and the real
A basic path of my inquiry  on Presence and Representation concerns their 
function in the constitution of the real, aiming to revaluate their meaning. 
This questioning involves a practical and a theoretical analysis of the 
visual language, trying to detect the hidden conventions.
Umberto Eco argues that ‘through familiarity an iconic signifier can acquire primacy over its 
signified. Such a sign becomes conventional step by step, the more its addressee becomes 
acquainted with it. At a certain point the iconic representation, however stylized it may  be, appears 
to be more true than the real experience, and people begin to look at things through the glasses of 
iconic convention’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3). Jean Baudrillard in his paradigm of Disney/land (1994, 
p. 12) informs us about how deep this iconic convention goes: ‘Disney/land is presented as 
imaginary  in order to make us believe that the rest is real, whereas all of Los Angeles and the 
America that surrounds it are no longer real, but belong to the hyperreal order and to the order of 
simulation. It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality  (ideology) but of concealing 
the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle1.’ 
The examination of this faculty  of convention and the consequent replacement of the real by mute 
images, by the ‘present without presence’, is what Lefebvre (2004, p. 39) named le dressage: ‘To 
enter into a society, group or nationality  is to accept values (that are taught), to learn a trade by 
following the right  channels, but also to bend oneself (to be bent) to its ways. Which means to say: 
dressage’. The inherent and endogenous rhythmical element of the visual language contains 
conventional rhythms. ‘The sciences of dressage take account of many aspects and elements: 
duration, harshness, punishments and rewards. Thus rhythms compose themselves. [...] Dressage 
determines the majority of rhythms’ (Lefebvre, 2004, p. 40). In this context, the adoption of 
rhythm as a methodological tool – both theoretical and practical – in my research becomes 
apparent.
According to Pierce’s model of the sign, reality can only be known via signs. ‘If representations are 
our only access to reality, determining their accuracy is a critical issue. Pierce adopted from logic 
the notion of modality to refer to the truth value of a sign’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3). I theoretically 
and practically  examine the relevance of contemporary critical discourse to representation and 
associate it with older considerations such as Aristotle’s, who expresses the view (Metaphysics, i, 
6.4) that, ‘things exist in their plurality by participation in (µ!"#$%& [methexis]) the forms after 
which they are named, that to say that they  exist by imitation or exist by  participation is no more 
than a use of different words to say  the same thing.’ In the Aristotelian terminology, ‘Form (=#'()& 
[eidos] as %(!* [idea]) and presentation (=+*%,-µ#,), [phenomenon]) are nama (name, quiddity) 
and rupa (shape, appearance, body); or in the special case of verbal expressions, artha (meaning, 
value) and sabda (sound); the former being the intellectual (manasa, ,)./-&) and the latter the 
tangible or aesthetic (sprsya, drsya, *%0"./%1-&, )2*/-&) apprehensions’ (Coomaraswamy, 1981, p. 
144).
Such would be, according to Jean Baudrillard, the complex implications of representation and its 
relation to reality in successive phases of the image:
• !t is the reflection of a profound reality;
1 The emphasis with bold letters, here as well as throughout the whole paper, is added by me.
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• it masks and denatures a profound reality;
• it masks the absence of a profound reality;
• it has no relation to any reality whatsoever, it is its own pure simulacrum.
‘In the first case, the image is a good appearance – representation is of the sacramental order. In the 
second, it is an evil appearance – it is of the order of maleficence. In the third, it  plays at being an 
appearance – it  is of the order of sorcery. In the fourth, it  is no longer of the order of appearances, 
but of simulation’ (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 6).
2.4. Gerhard Richter’s colour chart images
I insisted on and continued the research that I had initiated last 
year on Gerhard Richter and his critique on the mediation of 
the creative process. This year I concentrated on his series of 
Colour charts (see Figure 10), which, apart from the apparent 
relation with the colour charts that I use in my work, 
‘represent a middle point, in the sense of a point of 
indifference, between photographic and painterly  means, 
establishing a more direct relationship to the problematic of 
visual per se’ (Osborne, 1998, p. 97).
For Peter Osborne (1998, p. 99), “image” is the most 
appropriate word to refer to Richter’s work, as ‘It is the virtue 
of the notion of the image that it  combines the aesthetic, 
spatiotemporal concretion of an object of sight with the 
element of abstraction inherent in ideas. [...] an image has 
always been a visual presentation of reality, at once sensuous 
and particular, ideal and abstract.’
The split that the theoretician observes between aesthetics and semiotics reconnects, in a peculiar 
manner, the contemporary critique with the older considerations on representation described by 
Aristotle. ‘Aesthetics and semiotics are the torn, antinomic halves of the artwork between which 
contemporary  art theory shuttles back and forth, in a decidedly  non-dialectical oscillation. This 
historical split, internal to the theoretical comprehension of the image – a split between meaning 
and sensibility [artha and sabda, or, !"#$ and %$!&'µ(&)&, respectively] signification and aesthesis 
– registers both the changing social function of images consequent upon the declining power of the 
church (desacralization and commodified reenchantment) and the development of new technologies 
of image production. It forms the background to Richter’s art. Indeed, it is to a great extent its 
content: what it is about’ (Osborne, 1998, p. 100).
It can be said that  in Richter’s work, recognition and disavowal, exposure and concealment meet, 
and the reconciliation of the opposites can be found in the “shiny blurs” which, as Hal Foster puts 
it, ‘reflect on the vicissitudes of the Shein (= light in German) in modern times’ (Foster, 2003, p. 
131). Richter introduces a new kind of image space within his creative strategy, as he highlights 
‘both the aesthetic dimension of the denotative aspect of the photograph (the aesthetic dimension of 
semiosis) and the mechanical reproductive (semiotic) quality of the painterly image, through the 
literal mapping of the painterly onto the photographic image, in a speculative identity which 
produces a qualitatively new kind of image space’ (Osborne, 1998, p. 103).
Figure 10
One of the 25 colours series, 2007
enamel on alu-diband, 48.7 x 48.7 cm
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!he directional manner that guides my creative process for the completion of the work Polyptych IV 
allows the reproduction of an unlimited number of the units, which may produce an unlimited 
number of compositions, and the production of unlimited combinations of the both technically  and 
manually  produced pixels glued on each unit. In this way, I identify  a connection with what 
Osborne mentions (1998, p. 109) about a ‘modification of Benjamin’s opposition of reproduction to 
the aura.’
I cite here the quotation from Adorno’s Aesthetic theory, as it offers me a stimulus in order to make 
further progress in my research inquiry:
“There is an obvious qualitative leap between the hand that draws an animal on the wall of a 
cave and the camera that  makes it possible for the same image to appear simultaneously at 
innumerable places. But the objectivation [Objektivation] of the cave drawing vis-à-vis what 
is unmediatedly  seen already contains the potential of the technical procedure that effects the 
seperation of what is seen from the subjective act of seeing. Each work, insofar as it is 
intended for many, is already its own reproduction.” (Osborne, 1998, p. 109)
This constitutes reproducibility as “the ground of iconicity”; reproducibility produces resemblance.
In my practice, the chart compositional arrangement also refers to the traditional conception of such 
orientation manifested in the chess board. It is a different generation of numerical organization of 
the surface than that  of Richter’s, where he worked out a system with a continual subdivision 
(differentiation) through equal gradations. 4 x 4 = 16 x 4 = 64 x 4 = 256 x 4 = 1,024.
The chessboard formation represents the world and it  is related to ‘a 
mathematical equation revealing the inner connection between freedom 
of action and the inevitability of fate [the notion of chance, possibility 
and freedom has been explored by  all three artists discussed in my 
research, i.e., Xenakis, Richter and Bacon]. [...] It is a simplified 
representation of the cosmic cycles, which are reproduced in a 
geometrical scheme on the chessboard. The four center squares of the 
chessboard represent the four basic phases of all cycles, ages as well as 
seasons. The squares immediately surrounding them correspond to the 
orbit of the sun, or the twelve signs of the zodiac, while the outer rim of 
squares represent the twenty eight houses of the moon. The alternatives 
of black and white is like that of day and night. The whole square 
board, which the Indians call asthapada, with its squares of eight by 
eight, is a “congelation” of the cosmic movements, which unfold in 
time – it is the world’ (Burckhardt, 1972, p. 118) (see Figure 11).
Figure 11
The geometrical scheme 
of the chess board 
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2.5. Gerhard Richter’s 4900 colours
‘The concept is really chance. The possibility to produce paintings that I haven’t made.’ 
(Richter, 2008, p. 117)
Gerhard Richter’s work 4900 colours forms a paradigm of a basic strand of his creative process and 
research, that  exemplifies the operation of chance in the production of the artwork. With the 
adoption of a systematic incorporation of chance in 4900 colours, Richter problematizes and 
questions the mastership of the author, thus removing the subjective compositional preferences of 
the artist  and desubjectivising painting. Additionally, reciting Theodor Adorno’s “radical 
negativity”, Richter ‘denied the credibility of any  traditional form of cultural representation that 
claims to articulate and mediate subjective experience’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 69).
Historically, the particular artwork is placed by Benjamin H.D. Buchloh within the general “abstract 
art” category as a “diagrammatic abstraction”, where ‘abstraction becomes a purely quantitative 
regime and functions as a schema of data collection and registration’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 66). 
‘The diagram [contributes] a dissenting voice to the heroic chorus of abstraction, recognizing the 
degree to which the painter and the spectator as perceptual and desiring subjects are always already 
contained in systems of spatiotemporal quantification1  – an episteme of control and statistical 
registration. Thus diagrammatic abstraction records the forms of the disenchantment of the world, 
the subject’s submission to legal and administrative control’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 64).
Diagrammatic abstraction betrays an affinity with deconstructional strategies, as it opposes 
abstraction’s traditional transcendence (i.e., the metaphysical  reading of  signification) and rejects 
the ‘myth of painterly subjectivity in favor of an emphatic foregrounding of a pre-existing, external 
structural determination’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 68). Furthermore, testifying to this affinity, 
‘Richter’s 4900 colours confronts us with the conundrum of a possibly endless repetition of the 
same and a potentially  endless accumulation of difference’2  (Richter, 2008). The colour chart 
paintings are ‘eradicating any  hierarchy of subject3  or representational intent and focusing on 
1 Quantification in mathematics and in empirical science is the act of counting and measuring that transforms human 
sense observations and experiences into members of some sets of numbers.
2 Cf. the differance/trace concept of Jacques Derrida in the theoretical context section.
3 It may be beneficial if this is seen in the light of the Derridean endless deferment-differentiation of differance, i.e., 
archi-trace: ‘Probabilistic or not, the perception of chance [in 4900 colours] acknowledges scansions of time, while the 
subject defines itself through the introduction of the temporal, an interval’ (Richter, 2008, p. 128).
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colour to create an egalitarean language of art’ (Richter, 2008, p. 7). The syntax of the grid 
formation of 4900 colours and its units modulation and continuous re-contextualization of the 
overall text comply with my personal practical investigations that are translated into the polyptych 
compositional arrangement4 and the modules of the Polyptych IV project (see Figure 12, Appendix: 
Images 31-35). In effect, this strategy tests the literalness of the visual language. ‘In his colour 
charts Richter made as much recourse to the aesthetic of trivial anonymity  and the motley colours 
of Pop Art as he did to the reductionist principles of a visual language reduced to impersonal, 
neutral and lapidary forms, the literalism of Minimal Art – the strategies in both cases being 
serial’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, note 11, p. 130). In charts like Richter’s, that have become modular, 
Pelzer wonders, ‘where is the whole? Depending on the version, the independent parts can be 
separated and then reunited. In this whole of fixed yet  unlimited form, there is and there isn’t a 
whole. Richter disassociates the idea of all from the whole’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 125).
The quest (on Richter’s behalf) of an open5 
elaboration of the work stemmed from an 
acceptance of the priority of a shifting signified. 
According to Pelzer, ‘If the work exists as a 
concept, Richter adds that in its appearance as a 
visual phenomenon, it is different every time, and 
that it matters to him to find a form allowing for 
this dissemblance, this oddness within the 11 
versions of 4900colours’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 
117). This Richter’s statement inevitably entails 
and reflects a preconception of presence (the 
concept) and its representation (the appearance as a 
visual phenomenon) and exemplifies the mode of 
their coherent introduction.
Chance, that, for Birgit Pelzer, ‘allowed [Richter] 
to take on his age-old adversaries, uncertainty  and 
arbitrariness’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 117), points 
at the argumentation on the arbitrariness of the 
signifier, originating from the early semiotical 
analysis. The strategy to overcome this 
arbitrariness is ‘by putting powerlessness in a 
position to act, [so that it] could fight the 
indeterminate on its own grounds, using its own 
weapons’6 (Richter, 2008). 
 
4 Cf. the notation on Derrida at the end of the paragraph dedicated to him in the theoretical context section, as well as 
the greek movie To p!thari, and especially Veggos’ poem, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rVZXTJAgMpI.
5 Cf. Agamben’s (1999, p. 66) definition of the “open”: ‘“Open work” means: work that does not possess itself in its 
own "#$%& as in its end, work that is never at work, that is (if it is true that work is "'()*"!+), nonwork, $,'+µ!&, 
availability, and potentiality.’
6 Cf. the entropy registration in the theoretical context section.
Figure 12
The computer generated numbers 
for the 25 colours in 4900 colours
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Richter’s parallel investigation of chance application during the creative process involves, in 
Pelzer’s words, ‘an appeal to numeric chance’, where he ‘renders visible a logical numbered 
writing, a combination disconnected from any noticeable proof. We are faced with a literal 
formalisation of colour. [...] To formalise is to reduce to the syntactic. In the colours that are 
reduced to a number there is no longer call for sensitive intuition but for wavelengths’ (Buchloh et 
al., 2008, p. 123).
Alain Badiou (2008, p. 3) states that ‘number governs cultural representations. [...] It is in its very 
essence that the cultural fabric is woven by number alone. A cultural fact  is a numerical fact.’7 
According to Pelzer, ‘The power of the programmed numbered formula is that it is wordless, 
beyond dialogue. The algorithm acts, it works. The computer obeys, operating like an automaton 
with its cold indifference. Numbering brackets the question of meaning, of the address, of the 
destination. The language is that of the computer programme. It encodes, puts in order, combines, 
moves and repeats the 25 colours. It proposes continuities, redundancies and exclusions according 
to its semantics. The result is close to a visual language, with its syntax, its vocabulary  reduced to 
25 colours. A strange state of visual language’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 126). This visual language 
incorporates number theorizing and practical application, i.e., the distribution of the compositional 
units. ‘This definitive stature of numbering [...] results in a transformation of our rapport with 
reality’ (Buchloch et al., 2008, note 10, p. 130).
As ‘appearance cannot put itself in order from nothing, but from something that presents itself as a 
kind of articulation [=the nexus of the text], which in this case is a combination of 25 colours’,  it 
may  be argued that this kind of desubjectifized – chance-processed – presence is ‘turned toward 
nothingness. [...] Availability-toward-nothingness, although it is not yet work, is in some way a 
negative presence, a shadow of being-at-work: it is !"#$%!&', work, and as such constitutes the 
most urgent  critical appeal that the artistic consciousness of our time has expressed toward the 
alienated essence of the work of art’ (Agamben, 1999, p. 67).
As Pelzer puts it, chance ‘becomes the method of selection of colours in an integrated principle of 
equivalence’ (Buchloh et al., 2008, p. 119). Derrida, whose deconstructive theory consisted of an 
assault on the visual – as a form of presence that his idea of spacing as an aspect of deferral (or 
différance) was meant to dismantle – often invented surprisingly effective visual metaphors for his 
concepts. For example, the insertion of Mallarmé’s Mimique into a corner of Plato’s Philebus 
suggests, visually, the idea of the fold [=ptych], or redoubling, that  Derrida produces as a new 
7 Cf. the chapter about Xenakis and the 0 subsection in the theoretical context section.
Figure 13
The 25 colour scale for 4900 colours, the magic square and diagram of the sequence of numbers in the magic square
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concept of mimesis, in which the double (or second-order copy) doubles no single (or original). 
Another example occurs in the essay The parergon, where a succession of graphic frames is 
interspersed throughout a text focused on the function of the frame of the work of art, a frame that 
attempts to essentialize the work as autonomous but which does nothing more than connect it to its 
context or nonwork (Buchloch et al., 2008, p. 46).
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2.6. Giorgio Morandi, Arthur Danto and Mathew Gale
In the last few years there has been a renewed interest in Morandi’s work, and many contemporary 
artists refer in different ways to his work; to the notions of collection and archive related to the 
process of his work and the spatiotemporal character of his artistic vocabulary. A recent example of 
this association can be demonstrated in the exhibition Passing thoughts and making plans at the 
Jerwood place, where three of the artists, Tacita Dean, Rachel Whiteread and Cornelia Parker, have 
evidently  linked their practice with Morandi’s work, verifying the contemporary relevance of his 
art. 
It is very interesting to me that  his work is characterized by a progressive move towards a kind of 
abstraction that is developed through and connected to observation (see Figure 15). His saying that 
‘nothing is more abstract than reality’ shows his reflection on the real and reveals the way he 
regarded painting, which goes beyond a mere representation of objects. His painting is an 
‘ontological investigation of the act  of making’ (Gale and De Salvo, 2001, p. 15), an investigation 
of the “basics of art”.
It is essential that the theoretical analysis of his vocabulary  has mainly been attempted through the 
notions of space and time. Cornelia Parker notes, ‘[…] Somehow, the narrowing of focus, the 
limited tonal range, the repetitive exploration of the most ordinary of objects, all add up to the 
creation of an immense space for projection’ (Gale and De Salvo, 2001, p. 60).
The spatiotemporal characteristics in his work are very closely  related to his process, starting from 
the preparatory stage, when he arranges the objects in space, on the several tables he used. After 
each arrangement that he made on a table, he would mark the position of each bottle on the 
horizontal plane. In a future arrangement he would move some of the bottles to other positions or 
out of the arrangement, and he would put others on the “stage”, keeping one or some in the exact 
previous position. Then he would re-mark their position in the horizontal plane. In this way he was 
creating a palimpsest in space that would reflect the temporal aspect of his compositions (see 
Figure 14). 
This arrangement would often 
coincide with applying a coat of 
paint over the actual objects, so 
there is an in-between stage of 
painting  among the actual objects 
in space and the painting on the 
canvas. ‘The process through 
which Morandi built up his 
compositions is traced through a 
step  by step discussion of the 
passage from arrangement to 
finished painting’ (Gale and De 
S a l v o , 2 0 0 1 , p . 8 6 ) . T h i s 
methodology generates a history  of 
displacement and a history of 
Figure 14
Morandi’s spatiotemporal palimpsest
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simultaneity, that can be found in his process of arrangement as well as in the compositions of the 
finished painting themselves, where ‘the same bottle […] occupies two different spots in the same 
composition’ (Danto, 2008, p. 36) (see Figure 14, Appendix: !mage 20).
Morandi’s process to record and keep an archive of the spatiotemporal changes of his arrangements 
of objects and different conditions of light, together with the scholar’s critical discourse on this 
strategy, influenced the generation of my archival recordings and the way I intend to use them as a 
tool in my research methodology.  
I have examined the work of Francis Bacon, Gerhard Richter and Giorgio Morandi in order to 
understand the way they overcome the antithesis between abstraction and figuration in their 
different representational processes. They all renegotiate and question our perception and 
constitution of the real. 
Figure 15
Still life, 1947
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2.7. Iannis Xenakis, Henri Lefebvre and rhythm
In continuation of my previous research on rhythm, I initiated a 
research on the work of the composer and architect Iannis Xenakis. 
His explorations on the relationship between music and 
architecture, which were manifested by composing music for 
specific locations and architectural buildings, and designing 
buildings to host specific musical compositions (see Figure 16), 
open up new perspectives for my questioning on Presence and 
Representation and my interdisciplinary practice.
Xenakis used the term polytope to describe his audiovisual installations. ‘The term polytope 
captures the complexity  of the spatial designs and multiple spaces of this unusual light-and-sound 
works’ (Harley, 1998, p. 55). The spatial properties of sound were at the centre of his explorations 
and are exemplified in the creation of the sonic “spatial relief”. In the elaboration of his projects he 
used the language of mathematics and geometry – points, lines and surfaces – to discuss aural 
phenomena (see Figure 17). These investigations are ‘examples to demonstrate how an auditory 
space could be structured by means of abstract morphological principles’ (Harley, 1998, p. 56). The 
element of representation is manifested in various projects and sketches, such as the Anemone (see 
Figure 18), a distant resemblance of a natural phenomenon. The Anemone sketch represents a light 
pattern for the Polytope de Cluny. ‘The pattern is created by laser beams reflecting off mirrors 
placed on the scaffolding in the performance space. As 
the position of these mirrors shifted, so did the shapes 
of the anemones’ (Harley, 1998, p. 60). I initiated such 
an exploration in the work Polyptych IV, in which I use 
a representational element (the sea waves), along with 
geometry elements (points, lines and surfaces), as well 
as a rhythmical analysis to discuss optical phenomena.
Lefebvre (2004, p. 17) classifies rhythms ‘by crossing 
the notion of rhythm with those of the secret and 
public, the external and internal’, and Xenakis’ 
installations in specific locations (Montreal, Persepolis, 
Mycenes) seem to fulfill the criteria of all Lefebvre’s 
(2004, p. 18) categorizations:
a) Secret rhythms: First, physiological rhythms, 
but also psychological ones (recollection and memory, 
the said and the non-said, etc.).
b) Public (therefore social) rhythms: Calendars, 
fetes, ceremonies and celebrations; or those that one 
declares and those that one exhibits as virtuality, as 
expression (digestion, tiredness, etc.).
c) Fictional rhythms: Eloquence and verbal 
rhythms, but also elegance, gestures and learning 
processes. Those which are related to false secrets, or 
pseudo-dissimulations (short-, medium- and long-term 
calculations and estimations). The imaginary!
d) Dominating-dominated rhythms: Completely 
Figure 16
Iannis Xenakis / Le Corbusier, 
model of the Philips pavillion, 
1958
Figure 17
Drawing for the work Achorripsis, 1957
Figure 18
Anemone, drawing for the work 
Polytope de Cluny, 1972
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made up; everyday or long lasting, in music or in speech, aiming for an effect that is beyond 
themselves.
The relation of rhythm with music is self-evident. ‘Music integrates the functions, the values of 
Rhythm’. (Lefebvre, 2004, p. 66). Xenakis applied a logistic distribution ‘to create the musical 
form, rhythmic transformations, complex timbres and the variable streams of pitch-and-intensity 
patterns he called tresses rhythmiques (rhythmic strands)’ (Harley, 1998,  p. 61).
I detect a link between the description of Xenakis’ work Pithoprakta and its rhythmical analysis, 
and the Deleuzean analysis on rhythm that is inspired by Bacon’s work. Pithopracta (see Figure 19) 
is a rendition of a musical code to a different code, thus visualizing the sonic. Towards the top of 
the vertical axis acerb sounds are positioned, and towards the bottom of the vertical axis roll 
sounds. At the horizontal axis time is indicated. Thus a point on this two-dimensional space 
signifies an instantaneous sound without temporal extension or sonic differentiation, the pizzicato in 
musical terminology. A sound that outlasts for a definite temporal period without sonic 
differentiations is represented with a horizontal line. An ascending or descending diagonal line 
represents a glissando, i.e., a differentiated sound. All these calculations are made for each 
instrument of the orchestra. 
Deleuze (2008, p. 54) observes: 
[…] an “active” rhythm, with an increasing variation or amplification, then a “passive” rhythm with a 
decreasing variation or elimination, and finally, the “attendant” rhythm, i.e., the constant one. 
Pictorially we usually recognize the first two as verticals in a descending–rising opposition, a 
diastolic–systolic opposition, a naked–clothed opposition and an augmentation–diminution opposition 
[…] and the attendant rhythm as horizontal that  defines a rhythm that  is retrogradable in itself, thus 
without increase or decrease. (Deleuze, 2008, p. 54)
Figure 19
Drawing for the work Pithoprakta, 1955-56
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2.8. Susan Hiller
‘You’ve never seen me, you don’t know that we’re civilized nation, we have beautiful language.’
(Gallagher, 2011, p. 34)
My personal interest on Susan 
Hiller’s work lies on her overall 
interdisciplinary approach and 
methodology, as she often adopts the 
role of the artist  as a curator, 
reinstating, inter alia, questions of 
authorship, the interrelationship 
between image and text/language and 
reality, in an effort ‘to make the 
invisible visible’ (Gallagher, 2011, p. 
20). 
Specifically, I focus on the nexus1 of 
Hiller ’s visual language – its 
a r t i cu la t ions , me taphors and 
transpositions – retaining the 
“idiosyncratic nature” of the cultural 
artifacts.2  ‘Hiller brought with her 
from anthropology a methodology 
rather than any  specific theory. When 
she uses cultural artifacts, from 
potshards to postcards, she does not 
project meanings onto them but 
retains their “idiosyncratic nature” 
which affects the way  they are 
perceived and illuminates their 
significance in relation to our own 
c u l t u r e – s o m e t h i n g m o s t 
anthropologists ignore and of which 
most artists are ignorant’ (Gallagher, 
2011, p. 12).
Hiller developed a “taxonomic 
method” of presentation, ‘indicative 
of  [her] interest  in museological 
traditions of display’ (Gallagher, 
2011, p. 13), which I relate to my 
elaboration of polyptychs, and 
especially to their “specificity” (the 
1 Cf. the related to the text/textile paragraph in the theoretical context section.
2 Cf. Hiller’s montage practice and editing, as well as her “coagulated” fragments – ‘Yes, I am interested in fragments 
of films’ (Gallagher, 2011, p. 33).
Figure 20
The last silent movie, 2007, single channel projection with sound, 
20 min; 24 etchings on paper based upon oscilloscope traces of 
the voices heard on the soundtrack, each 37 x 42,5 cm
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literal) and Richter’s visual syntax.3 Her artistic 
enterprise, in accordance with my personal 
creative practice, ‘was also reluctant to eliminate 
materiality or any suggestion of craft  from the 
artwork. She began to develop strategies that 
reconciled these opposing impulses’ (Gallagher, 
2011,  p. 14).
On top of that, the research on Hiller’s work 
informs the evolution of the rhythm concept 
which I use in many instances, both in 
theoretical analysis and practical application, 
reexamining the endless reformation of (visual) 
language, i.e., its entanglement with the reality 
(see Figure 20).
In her work The last silent movie Hiller 
acknowledges rhythm as ‘a very  important 
aspect of this work, the way the speech rhythm 
controls the visual rhythm’ (Gallagher, 2011, p. 
34). The acoustic traces transcribed on paper by 
the oscilloscope traces of the voices are 
comparable, inter alia, with Iannis Xenakis’ 
permutations between senses and the metre 
studies of basic rhythmic structure of a verse or 
lines in poetry.4 Important to this research is the 
consideration and rethinking of the in-between, 
the gap, the pause, the interval, the white page – 
an articulation of rhythm as in the etymological 
sense.5 
In the ancient Greek description of rhythm can be found early  traces of the modern linguistic 
analysis of word function as difference relevant to a big area of Hiller’s research (see Figure 21). 
‘In the first book of Metaphysics (985b), Aristotle, explaining the theory  of the atomists, who put 
emptiness and fullness at the origin and derived all things from them by way  of “difference,” says 
that according to Leucippus and Democritus this “difference” had three species – !"#µ$ %&' ('&)'*+ 
3 Cf. the chapters about Richter.
4 Cf. Aris Retsos’ research on Greek ancient µ,-!'%+ (metre), at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTNekOYh3mQ. 
5 !"#µ$%, Ion. !"&µ$% (v. infr. 111, IV), ': (!()):
A. any regular recurring motion 
I. measured motion, time, whether in sound or motion,
2. special phrases: *+ ,"#µ-,  in time, of dancing, marching,  etc., *+ .) ,"#µ- /+/0+*1+, respire regularly, 
Arist.Pr.882b1
II. measure, proportion or symmetry of parts, at rest as well as in motion
III. generally, proportion, arrangement, order
IV. state or condition of anything, temper, disposition
V. form,  shape of a thing, Democr.5i; identified by Arist.  with &23µ/, Metaph.985b16,1042b14; µ*.(4/56+ .6+ 
,. .)+ 7,/µµ8.)+, changed the form or shape of the letters, Hdt.5.58
VI. manner, fashion of a thing.
(Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English lexicon, at www.perseus.tufts.edu) 
Also cf. the presence–absence dipole in the chapters about Richter.
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Figure 21
Enquiries/Inquiries, 1973, 
2 carousels, each with 80 slides
%&' -!./+ – and defined rhythm as #0+µ& (from 102), way of holding together, structure’6 
(Agamben, 1999, p. 127, note 3). In Giorgio Agamben’s (1999, pp. 97-99) reading of Aristotle, he 
‘identifies [...] the original principle of presence precisely with !")µ34 (rhythm)’ and, additionally, 
argues that this principle of presence ‘opens and maintains the work of art in its original space.’ 
This ‘ekstasis in a more original dimension’ is achieved by a kind of stop in time (=ek-stasis) of the 
!.+, i.e., the flow of time.7 Rhythm is ‘the power that grants the work of art its original space.’ The 
word “rhythm” comes from the Greek !12, which means to flow, as in the case of water.8 ‘That 
which flows does so in a temporal dimension: it flows in time’ (Agamben, 1999, p. 99). Time and 
space, as shown throughout art history,9 are intrinsic elements of the visual language.10
‘Every work of art is one rhythm.’ 
–Hölderlin11
6 Cf. the signatures doctrine in the theoretical context section.
7 See above the Liddell-Scott definition of !.+=rhythm.
8 See the artwork Sea.
9 Cf. the chapter about Morandi.
10 That is, essentially and etymologically, the metaphor – i.e., the transposition, as Hiller comments.
11 As quoted in Von Arnim (1840).
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3. CREATIVE PRACTICE
3.1. Creative practice 2009-2010
During the academic year 2009-2010 I have been exploring the transitions between the actual 
perceptible space and the created visual space of the artifact by using painting, sculptural and 
architectural means. With the osmosis and synthesis of the two notions I aim to re-examine the 
constitution of the notion of the real, the process of re-presentation and the interrelated 
spatiotemporal dynamics of presence. I investigate the multiplicity  of the different aspects of space 
and the implications of time, and I undertake a process of negotiation, transformation and re-
composition of all of these stimuli into artwork where the figural and the abstract coexist. The 
outcome, which may  seem to be characterized by the notion of fragmentation, displacement and 
simultaneity, is a pursuit to co-ordinate the spatiotemporal dynamics of space and re-achieve the 
unity and the inner rhythm of my perception of space through plastic means. 
Early in the  year, I was mainly working on the subject matter of the human figure and its 
surrounding space, that I considered and manipulated as inseparable and always in flux. I was 
working directly from observation of the perceptible world and I was moving my position of 
observation in relation to the subject as a sculptor does. This multidimensional lived experience is 
affected by two interrelated and inseparable factors: (a) the object (i.e., the place, “the fact” in 
Deleuze’s terms) and (b) the subject (nervous system, vital movement, “instinct”, temperament) 
(Deleuze, 2008, p. 25). 
The manipulation of diverse means and techniques (i.e., painting, carving, sculptural applications, 
sculptural use of colour) corresponds to the transition from the actual space to the space of the 
artifact, as the lived multidimensional experience is not only visual but haptic as well.
Soon, my research, the reflection on my aims 
and the feedback from supervisory tutorials, 
led me to include in the method of my creative 
strategy the use of photography.
  
During a first  stage of working from 
observation in order to gain an intimate 
experience of my subject-matter and begin 
composing the work, I started collecting 
photographic documentation of my subject 
from different points of view and at  different 
times of the day, capturing the changes of 
light. 
In a second phase, I would work by using the 
collected photographic archive that contained 
fragmented aspects of my subject, initiating an 
abstract process of experimentation and 
changes informed by  the photographical 
fragments and the fragmented attributes of my 
memory from the first phase. I would 
Figure 22
Untitled, 2010, oil on wood, 35 x 35cm
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compose, reflect on the outcome and recompose in 
a manner that hovers between figuration and 
abstraction. 
Finally, when the composition of these fragments 
would start to acquire an overall unity and rhythm, 
the work would develop  in a more decisive 
direction, always preserving a condition where the 
figural and the abstract coexist (see Figures 22, 23). 
With the inclusion of photography in my creative 
process I tried to reassess my process through the 
different possibilities afforded by this medium. 
Baudrillard (1998, pp. 236-237) describes this 
difference as follows: ‘Rather than having the presence and representation of the subject foisted 
upon the object, […] the object  becomes the site of the absence and disappearance of the subject. 
[…] Photography conveys the state of the world in our absence.’ This dialogue is about the reality 
principle itself. 
The addition of photography in my method changes the function of the lived experience presented 
above to a degree, as now the photography allows only a visually  static experience of an absent 
object. The wide range of sensations that form the experience and affect the development of my 
work have to be retrieved through the activation of the memory. The potential to capture the 
changes by  photographing multiple aspects of the subject in many different times, and the activation 
of memory that transforms and blurs the apprehension of reality  added new dimensions to the 
figural and the abstract elements that coexist in my artwork.
The adaption of the technical medium of the camera in my creative process and the reflection on its 
potentials during my creative experimentation led to an expansion of my subject matter to the space 
of the urban landscape. This evolution of my research was accompanied by the insertion of the 
medium of video documentation in my methodology. This tool allowed me to explore the 
spatiotemporal dynamics of presence more deeply, as it offered me the chance to collect  and reflect 
on material that records not only different aspects of space and different moments in time but also 
more attributes related to space and time; attributes such as the movement, the speed, the extent of 
diversities and similarities/repetitions and the inherent rhythm of the recorded landscape. 
In the first  phase I recorded day and night aspects of the city both from fixed points and in motion, 
from the inside of the train (see Figure 24). I elaborated my  material using the Adobe Premier 
Figure 23
Detail: Untitled, 2010, oil on wood
Figure 24
Stills from video clips from the archive that informed the composition of the Polyptych III-London
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computer programme, chosing the clips and extracting video stills that interested me. This process 
allowed me to reflect on both the spatial attributes of the recorded spaces (forms, patterns, 
materials, repetitions and diversities, scales, light, etc.) and the attributes of the medium itself (the 
structure of the digital image from pixels, the blurring when recording in motion, etc.). This process 
was accompanied by a realization of preparatory compositional drawings, where I reflected on and 
manipulated my choices from the fragments of data, studying, measuring and re-composing the 
spatial relationships of the pictorial and sculptural elements (see Figure 25). 
A priority  in my  process was the discovery of ways in which the broad subject matter of London’s 
urban space could be reduced in the small scale of the artwork and ways in which the artwork could 
acquire a tension that would imply its expansion to such a wide scale. This experimentation led me 
to several decisions, the main ones being the adaption of the form of the polyptych (see Figures 26, 
27, Appendix: Images 22, 23) and the preoccupation with the correlation of the work to the actual 
architectural space in which it would be positioned (see Figure 26, Appendix: Images 25, 26, 28). 
The choice of the polyptych as a compositional arrangement (a) relativizes the beginning and the 
end of the artwork’s limits, (b) follows existing patterns of the urban landscape, (c) allows the 
constitutive parts of the work to integrate with the space where the work is positioned as they 
function as parts in a wider structure, (d) relativizes the perception of the whole and the part  of the 
composition, and (e) promotes the rhythmical element of the outcome. 
Figure 25
Preparatory drawing for the Polyptych London  
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Figure 26
Polyptych III, 2010, acrylic gouache, w
ood, perspex, carving on w
ood, 5 pieces: 80 x 80 x 10.5 cm
 (w
idth x height x m
ax. depth) 
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Figure 27
Polyptych III, acrylic gouache, wood, perspex, carving 
on wood, 80 x 80 x 10.5 cm (width x height x depth) 30
3.2. Creative practice 2010-2011
In the previous year’s research I inaugurated an exploration of the notion of rhythm as a mode of 
analysis both in theory and practice. Further explorations concerning rhythm marked it out as a 
central methodological tool for my inquiry on Presence and Representation.
In the academic year 2010-2011 I experimented with applying a rhythmical manipulation in my 
creative process through the use of different  techniques. I initially elaborated a still-in-progress 
work that includes the projection of 25 painted frames (see Figures 28, 29) on a marble’s surface 
(see Appendix: Image 30). Metaphorically, the marble’s surface will welcome the projected image 
in a way similar to that of a shore that welcomes the sea. In this way, I aim to study the presence of 
the immaterial projected light and its meeting with the hard edged marble. Furthermore, carving on 
marble makes the rhythm that the piece of marble imposes by its own character more apparent. By 
means of the sound of the rhythmical carving and the rhythm of the carved marks and pauses, I 
make an attempt to connect the making process with the outcome of the artwork. 
In this creative process, three different considerations of space and time are interwoven:
• space and time as inherent components of the creative process, 
• the space and time of the 25 frames per second of my video camera,
• the “timeless” recurrence of the sea’s waves.
My reflection on the feedback that  I have received from the work in progress seminars helped me 
clarify my method of rhythmical analysis by better defining the quantitative rhythmical aspects and 
elements of my work, as the qualitative ones were already more apparent. This progress led to the 
work entitled Polyptych IV.   
Figure 29
Frame no. 10/25,
acrylic paint, pencil, rapidograph,
40 x 40 cm
Figure 28
Frame no. 5/25,
acrylic paint, pencil, rapidograph,
40 x 40 cm 
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Figure 30
One wave loop, video stills for the Polyptych IV
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Henri Lefebvre in his Rhythmanalysis (p. xii) describes the rhythmanalyst as ‘capable of listening to 
a house, a street, a town as one listens to a symphony, an opera.’ This kind of rhythmical analysis 
involves two successive movements simultaneously: a qualitative one, ‘as one listens to a 
symphony’, and a quantitative one, as ‘rhythm always implies a measure’ (p. 8), and vice-versa. 
This reciprocal action is inherent  to rhythm. ‘Rhythm reunites quantitative aspects and elements, 
which mark time and distinguish moments in it, and qualitative aspects and elements, which link 
them together, found the unities and result from them. Rhythm appears as regulated time, governed 
by rational laws, but in contact with what is least rational in human being: the lived, the carnal, the 
body’ (p. 9).
The subject  matter of my work entitled Polyptych IV is the flow, the rhythm of the sea’s waves. It is 
a representation of the sea that results from a rhythmical analysis of its presence. Each curve’s 
length in all five different units of the work is 31,4 cm (see Figure 31). The initial step in my 
process was to videotape the sea and then extract characteristic video stills representing the “loop” 
of the movement of a single wave (see Figure 30). In science and mathematics, the wave has been 
described as a disturbance that travels through space and time, usually  accompanied by a transfer of 
energy. ‘An energy is employed, unfolds in a time and a space (a space-time). Isn’t all expenditure 
of energy accomplished in accordance with a rhythm?’ (Lefebvre, 2004, p. 65). With these ideas in 
mind, in Polyptych IV ! tried to make apparent the congruousness of my method and practice/
artwork, as it will become clear later.
The use of a camera and the observation of the video stills in the computer, in order to make an 
analysis based on rhythm, raise questions concerning the immediacy of the medium. The theoretical 
problematization on whether ‘technologies kill immediacy’ (Lefebvre, 2004, p. 53) is a continuation 
of my previous exploration of the mediation of photography and video in the creative process. In a 
mode similar to the Derridean notion of differance (the aspect of non-presence), Lefebvre describes 
(2004, p. 47) this mediation as ‘present without presence.’ His distinction between presence and the 
present has greatly  infuenced my exploration of the constitution of the real and the interrelated 
notions of presence and representation. 
In Polyptych IV, I investigate, through the initial observation and the following video recordings 
and rhythmical analysis, the process of representation and the interrelated presence (represent). This 
investigation led to the creation of a relief polyptych that is structured through the combination of 
modules1  (see Figure 31, Appendix: Images 31-35). I realized this work in an interdisciplinary 
manner, combining the creative strategies of painting, sculpture, architecture. Relief ‘brings about 
the most  rigid link between the eye and the hand because its element is the flat  surface, which 
allows the eye to function like the sense of touch; furthermore, it  confers, and indeed imposes, upon 
the eye a tactile, or rather haptic, function; it thereby  ensures the joining together of the two senses 
of touch and sight, like the soil and the horizon’ (Deleuze, 2008, p. 85). 
The rhythmical analysis for the work Polyptych IV integrated the sense of hearing (in the way of the 
rhythmical arrangement of the units, and also in the way that, according to Johannes Itten (1974, p. 
1 modus: in 16th century Latin, it means “measure” (denoting an architectural unit of length).
module: each of a set of standardized parts or independent units that can be used to constract a more complex structure.
modulus: employing or involving a module or modules as the basis of design or construction (Oxford Latin mini 
dictionary, 2008).
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Figure 31
Polyptych IV, 2011, plaster, paper, digital colour print, 
20 x 20 x <10 cm 34
18), the red to violet analogy of electromagnetic vibration in the spectrum is equal to an octave, and 
the element of water. In Polyptych IV I am directly  referencing Bachelard’s consideration (1987) of 
the basic elements, i.e., the primal elements of the world, that is fire, air, water and earth, in relation 
to rhythmanalysis.
The planning of the five different curves resulted from a reduction to the essential movements of 
the sea waves. All of the five different wavy  curves have the same length, 31,4 cm, but each has a 
different wave amplitude: 10 cm, 8 cm, 6 cm, 4 cm and 2 cm. In addition, each of the five curves/
units of the work corresponds to a different wavelength, velocity and frequency. Each of these five 
modules is reproduced several times, but the copies, that are identical in shape, differ in colour. The 
in situ modulation of the units in the exhibition space contributes to the overall open form of the 
work, thanks to the different compositional possibilities that are available. The possible 
combinations of the units may  be subjected again to mathematical and proportional calculations, 
and each time they  constitute a different rhythmical progress. This strategy raises questions on the 
basis of decision making during the last stage of the creative process – i.e., to choose among a set of 
characteristics that are already at hand, such as tone, colour or light.
The overall shape of each of the five curvy clay molds, i.e., the negative from which we produce the 
copies we need, almost coincide with the so-called “positive”, which is a “film” made of paper that 
constitutes a unit, a module. This identification, as well as this technique, results from the fact that 
on this double-sided curved film of paper, on this unit, the negative and the positive coexist (see 
Appendix: Images 32-35). Each unit  of the five shapes can be used in four different possible ways, 
and each unit can occupy a different  part in the composition. The composition and the number of 
the units that are to be used are subjected to consideration in relation to the architectural space of 
the presentation of the piece. In this way, the form of the Polyptych IV remains open. 
As far as colour is concerned, I am experimenting with digital colouring methods. I have been 
exploring the structure and colour characteristics of the digital image of video stills, as well as the 
characteristics and limitations of this digital image’s processing by means of a computer and a 
printer. By zooming into the different spots of the images until the pixels are revealed and printing 
them, I get both the digital colour and structure imprinted on paper (see Appendix: Image 32). I 
then cut those prints in pixel-like squares of 5 cm, 4.5 cm, 4 cm, 3.5 cm and 3 cm, and glue them on 
the surface of the work’s modules. This process of a repetitive hand-made elaboration of the piece, 
that occurs from the gluing of the pixels on the surface of the curves/units, renders both the units 
and the overall work sui generis phenomenologically, in contradiction to the technologically 
fabricated reproduction of the coloured pixels. 
 
Finally, it can be said that the pre-decided measurements and shapes of the curves of the units, 
which precede their actual construction, the use of the digital colour, the repetitive gluing of pixels 
on the modules, the openness regarding the possible compositions of the work are all characteristics 
that could allow the making of the work by anyone following instructions. Of course, different 
people would add their own qualitative aspect of rhythm to the overall outcome. This “instructional/
directional” manner that guides the process of construction of a work which could be made by 
anyone that would follow the instructions poses the question of authority and its limitations.
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Figure 32
Polyptych IV, 2010, paper, acrylic adhesive, com
puter colour prints, 200 x 70 cm
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3.3. Creative practice 2011-2012
The polyptych formation applied as a compositional tool to my previous works has also been 
applied to the works Horizons I and Horizons II, but in the form of small units contained in a 
carpet’s texture. The carpet is used as a ground for painting, offering in advance this needed grid 
formation that I used for my Polyptychs in order to practically explore and relativize the limits 
between the artwork’s space and the surrounding space – a problem intrinsic to art practice.
 
The stimulus for the synthesis was a landscape; I abstractly painted this landscape, giving emphasis 
to the horizontal limitations of its planes, which I considered as horizons. A horizon is not only the 
non existing  existing place where sky and earth meet but also an intellectual and perceptual 
horizon. This is strongly  confirmed by  the traditional conception of ‘the horizontal direction [that] 
can be seen as representation of the human condition and the vertical direction as a representation 
of what transcends the particular situation’ (Guénon, 2001, p. 100). Colour attributes demonstrate a 
limitless limitation of such a kind (as horizon does), and the same goes for the artistic efforts to 
estimate the space–time analogies of the composition and the size and proportions of the lines. 
Two panels of the same size were placed to the right and to the left  of the painted carpet of 
Horizons I, as well as above and below the painted carpet of Horizons II (see Figures 33, 34). 
These panels were painted with car paint in order to mirror and reflect the light. The reflective 
quality of the peripheral panels was in contrast to the texture of the central panel. The application of 
this effect corresponds to the day–night  poles of the Sun’s movement – the edges of the painter’s 
palette. Representing these extreme poles, they  manifest characteristics of a different order 
(symbolical, reflective and participatory) than that of the middle painting, which was “woven” and 
generated between these unlimited limitations of the two poles. The reflective attribute of the polar 
panels refutes color itself, as the black panel reflects more light than it would normally  do, while, at 
the same time, the white panel demonstrates an unusual impenetrableness. Additionally, the 
reflection effect promotes an indefinability  in space–time definition, whereas the texture of the 
intermediate painting, nailed as it is on the wall, offers as a contrast to this indefinability  a definite 
materiality and space–time orientation.  
In my works Horizons I and II I elaborated the grid formation that I firstly adopted for the 
Polyptych  III (see Appendix: Images 26, 27), which in the specific works operates also as the nexus 
between black and white and the calculable digits of the synthesis. This compositional arrangement 
is connected with my Polyptychs’ quest inter alia on artistic control, measurement, proportional 
estimations, the whole and the part, the zooming-in of microcosmos and the zooming-out of 
macrocosmos, repetition and seriality. Additionally, the neutral scheme of the grid historically 
points to a big part of the modernist strategy to which I refer and to contemporary uses of this 
formation.
The works 7 Bells, Pebbles and 7 Vessels are a study on the basics of visual language; its space–
time range and correspondences. 7 Bells and 7 Vessels are equivalent to the seven-note scale and the 
seven colours of the visible spectrum. The two works reflect my interest  in the acoustic attributes of 
visual language, the transposition, metaphor and permutation of different disciplines, orders and 
states. The analogy of the volume quantity to the volume quality (the timbre), quality  and quantity 
in permutation, is a key  tool of my art research methodology (cf. the Artists and theorists section 
and the rhythm concept, see Appendix: Images 19, 21). 7 Bells and 7 Vessels are designed to be 
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Figure 33
Horizons I, 2011, wood, carpet, acrylic paint, varnish, 160 cm x 68 cm x 3
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Figure 34
Horizons II, 2011, acrylic paint, iron, car paint, carpet, 150 cm x 91 cm x 3
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Figure 35
7 Bells, 2011, iron, the bigger bell approxim
ately: 18 x 17 x 7 cm
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presented in different spaces, engaging each time with different spatiotemporal conditions (see 
Appendix: Image 38).
 
Pebbles is an ongoing project, in which I study the 
formation of a visual text (see Figure 37) (cf. my 
related research in the theoretical context section). 
Language is commonly  conceived as letters 
brought together to form words, to form sentences, 
to form a text (text-ure, text-ile, con-text). In a 
scene of the 2008 movie Departures (director: 
Yojiro Tacita, writer: Kundo Koyama), the young 
hero and his father exchange a pebble as a gift. The 
chosen pebble should be able to reflect and 
describe the son’s feelings for his father, and vice 
versa. The task was to find the proper kind of 
pebble in terms of texture, volume, colour, scheme; 
to find a vehicle for expressing particular feelings; 
to find the proper representatives, i.e., the proper 
signifiers.
Accordingly, a collection of pebbles can be 
endlessly  repositioned and recontextualized as 
units of a text acquiring different meanings each 
time (as in the “roles” of Morandi’s bottles). The 
fluidity of the composition reflects the fluidity of 
sensation and emotion, the !"# [roé] of rhythm 
(cf. the Polyptych IV sea project). Additionally, the 
collected around the Greek coasts pebbles 
introduce a notion of topicality, as different 
pebbles (shapes, colours, texture) are to be found 
in analogy to different geological layers. My intention was to study how this physical vocabulary 
influences art articulation and how art articulation, in turn, is sustained within nature’s vast 
dictionary, so as to establish a direct relationship to reality, together with art’s ‘symbolic 
transposition’ (Gallagher, 2011, p. 27). 
Figure 37
Pebbles, 2011, pebbles, 
A4 pebble-text arrangement
Figure 36
7 Vessels, 2011, glass vessels, water, acrylic paint, 12cm each vessel
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The site-specific installation Polyptych V-ASKT De Chirico Foyer 2011 has an affinity with what 
Giorgio Agamben described (1999) as ‘the crepuscular light of presence–absence’ where it is 
considered ‘the most alienated form of !"#$%&', the form in which privation itself comes into 
presence’ (see Figure 39). This work deals with such a state of presence–absence and reintroduces 
questions of authority. The aim of this work is to influence the given architectural conditions with 
an image of these conditions, to interweave the actual space–time with the imagery  of the 
photographic image. 
The common strategical gesture of my creative practice, to measure the architectural analogies and 
proportions, has also been mobilized for this piece. I then took numerous photographs of the 
existing corridor/passage of the space, readjusting composition, angle of view, aperture, aspect 
ratio, depth of field, depth of focus, diaphragm, resolution, exposure, film speed, saturation, time 
exposure... (see Figure 40). On the one hand there was the time, space and light produced from the 
photographic apparatus and on the other hand the same properties of the preexisting space and time, 
Figure 38
Paul Klee, visual representation of J.S. Bach’s musical phrase for three voices 
Figure 39
ASKT De Chirico Foyer 2011, 2011, the installation space
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Figure 40
Polyptych V, ASKT De Chirico Foyer 2011, photographies for the installation 43
where the windows of the room resemble the diaphragm of the camera. I cyclically  sutured and 
introduced the one space–time into the other with the duplication of the corridor with an image of it 
which had “exactly” the same dimensions (see Appendix: Images 36, 37). This stratagem refers to 
my Giorgio Morandi research and his tactic of repositioning and painting the same bottle in a 
different part of the composition (on his table), thus having a double of it and studying the space–
time attributes per se (see Figure 14). I molded the existing space as a sculptor, adding next to the 
real corridor’s entrance a wooden constructed plane on which I placed the photograph of this 
corridor. Subsequently, the passage became bigger, its acoustic properties intensified, together with 
its echo and repercussion properties, as well as the space, time and light conditions (see Figure 39). 
This practice challenges in a way the site specificity  – the literality, in linguistic terminology – of 
the work and reopens the question of the reality  principle – i.e., the ontological problem. The 
sculptural construction was designed as a reminiscent of a theatrical  scenery, underlying the 
presence–absence dipole (see Appendix: Images 36, 37).
Polyptych VI  
The vicissitudes of light  are the practical and theoretical vehicle for the development of my work 
Polyptych VI (see figure 41). The stimulus for the evolvement of this artwork is the open, fluid and 
always in change activity of the light that takes effect in specific spaces, which are both internal and 
external landscapes. With this ongoing project I aim to approximate and express the instant when 
the poetic process resonates with the pace of light, thus regaining a real dimension.
Figure 41, Polyptych VI, 2011-2012, oil and curving on wood, 9 pieces 40 x 40 x 1 cm (work in progress)
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In Polyptych VI, I sustained the relief character and the compositional arrangement of the polyptych 
that I used in previous pieces, as it stands between painting and sculpture and serves to address the 
relation of art with the reality principle. 
This work comes as the continuation of previous explorations on site specificity – the pictorial and 
the actual site, and their in-between limits. It brings into the discussion the pictorial/visual/imagery/
illusional two-dimensional space of the surface (dependent and subjective like a mirror eidolon), 
together with the tactile/sculptural/factual/material three-dimensional space (independent and 
objective like a rock). 
For the elaboration of this work I used strong impasto along with carving in order to respond to the 
fluidity prompted by the subject matter. This concurrence of the outcome with its creative process 
suggests the identification of the presence with its representation.
Practically, the artifact  absorbs and is absorbed by the surrounding space, and the “represented” is 
also my participation in the landscape that is to be represented, i.e., the artwork. The surrounding 
space reflects its atmosphere on the painted surface and, conversely, the artwork reflects its 
atmosphere on the surrounding space. For this reason, this work is to be presented within light 
conditions that possess such a fluctuation and openness. 
In comparison to my older work, Polyptych VI, it demonstrates a reduction of the distance between 
the “landscape” that is to be represented and the “landscape” of the painting. This practice often 
results in the disappearance and destruction of an obvious identification of a specific representation. 
It is only light that differs!     
Figure 42, Polyptych VI, 2011-2012, oil and curving on wood, 
one of the 9 pieces of dimensions 40 x 40 x 1 cm 45
4. PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
Solo exhibitions
2003, Chrysothemis Gallery, Athens, painting.
(twelve oil paintings on canvas)
Joint exhibitions
2011, ASKT, Athens, installation at the De Chirico Foyer.
2010, UEL, PD showcase, London, installation.
2009, Wimbledon College of Art, MA degree show, London, installation.
 (oil paint, carving and cuttings on three mdf panels and three white primed mdf panels)
2009, The Nunnery, Intersections, London, painting.
 (one oil painting on canvas and wood)
2003, Chrysothemis Gallery, Athens, painting.
 (two oil paintings on canvas)
2000, Miranda Gallery, Hydra (Greece), painting.
 (six oil paintings on canvas) 
Commissions
2004, 12 portraits of the University’s former Deans, Dimokritio University of Thrace, Greece.
Publications concerning my artwork
2003, To Vima (Greek newspaper), article by A. Zenakos.
2003, To Ethnos (Greek newspaper).
2003, Avriani (Greek newspaper).
Awards
2007, Academy of Athens, four-year scholarship for postgraduate studies abroad.
1998-2005, State Scholarships Foundation, Greece, shortlisted for the honorary scholarship 
 for high-score students in painting and sculpture.
Teaching experience
2011, V. Nikolakakou preparation centers for the Architectural Faculties, Athens,   
 Drawing Teacher, part-time employment.
2007-2008, Arsakio-Tositsio highschool, Athens, Art Teacher, full-time employment.
2007-2008, V. Nikolakakou preparation centers for the Architectural Faculties,   
  Drawing Teacher, part-time employment.
2006, Athens Concert Hall, children educational workshop on Constantin Brancusi, 
a collaboration of the Athens Concert Hall (Megaron Plus) with the Centre Georges 
Pompidou, member of the teaching team that run the programme, part-time employment.
2006-2007, Kalos Samaritis, house for old people, Athens, organizer of the workshop 
 for creative occupation, part-time employment.
2003, 2nd Department of Primary Education, 7th and 9th Primary Schools, Athens, 
 Art Teacher, part-time employment.
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5. CONCLUSION 
In my  practice, I have researched the creative process by introducing the compositional 
arrangement of the polyptych to a series of projects. This compositional formation is, for me, a 
medium to explore the nexus between the actual space and the pictorial space, and also to negotiate 
their limitations.
I have enquired into the relationship between the poetic1 space–time and the real-lived space–time, 
their interweaving, the literality of the poetic gesture, the gesture of making (=act=!"#$%&) – an 
enquiry that may be consequently characterized as an ontological pursuit.
In this context, subjective understanding of signification promotes the idea that reality is purely 
subjective and is constructed through our use of signs, whereas objective analysis conceives a single 
objective reality which exists indisputably outside of us.
The poetic consideration synthesizes the two comprehensions, not only through mere analysis, but 
by ways of a transposition from the rational to the transcendental; it finds and founds analogies 
between sensations and actions.  
In the process of the poetic manifestation – or, more specifically, representation – I have examined 
the important issue of visual, or pictorial,2 language – the intermediate of the expression. For me, 
the manipulation of the pictorial language is not only  a matter of shape/form, but primarily a matter 
of content/substance.3 
An essential attribute of this pictorial (!'()*%+,) language is rhythm, which is present before, 
during and after the elaboration of a project. My hypothesis is that rhythm as consonance comprises 
the artwork’s fundamental tool which allows it to communicate, as it regulates (rhythm--./%) the 
consonance of the inside to outside, and vice versa.
1 I use the word in its original meaning as !0-1)%&: a making, fabrication, creation, production, !"#$%& (action), Hdt., 
attic (H.-G. Liddell and R. Scott, An intermediate Greek-English, at www.perseus.tufts.edu).
2 Pictorial and visual stands here for the untranslatable Greek word !'()*%+,, from !"#$$%: put in a certain form, 
mould, form by education, training, form an image of a thing in the mind, imagine, metaph., fabricate, forge (H.-G. 
Liddell and R. Scott, An intermediate Greek-English, at www.perseus.tufts.edu).
3 Cf. Elytis, 1993, p. 41.
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A) THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Gilles Deleuze once wrote that a 
philosophical inquiry entails at least 
two elements: the identification of the 
problem and the choice of concepts 
that are adequate for approaching it. 
–Giorgio Agamben, 
The signature of all things, p. 76 
1. Aporia on artistic methodology
In fine art practice-based areas of study, methodologies are less well established than in other areas 
of study – or, in other words, fine art practice repulses a well established methodology, thus 
maintaining an entropy, or an openness. 
Historically, a shortcoming of this kind triggered Goethe’s suggestion for founding a theory of 
painting, a proposal which corresponds to the tendency for objectification of the subjective 
character of art practice and theory  of his times. Analogous pursuits were undertaken in 1920s by 
the avant-garde artists Paul Klee, Johannes Itten and Wassily Kandinsky.
Such an endeavor falls within the area of an epistemological pursuit. As far as the sciences are 
concerned, it is a question of the foundation of each episteme, i.e., ‘the investigation of the practical 
and theoretical methodology which forms the base upon which an epistemological object is formed 
and rendered functional. Thus, the objective of the epistemology, in general, is the reflection on the 
different epistemological objects and their foundations’ (Roussopoulos, 2011, p. 36).
These issues have to be met in fine art practice, if one wants to encounter the problem of evaluation 
of the artistic project and declare the criteria of his estimation – the success or failure of the 
assessed project.
Furthermore, this interest is consistent with an aspiration ‘to position the study of all types of 
cultural production (such as literature or the fine arts) on a more solidly  scientific basis of method 
and insight, rather than have criticism remain dependent on the various more-or-less subjective 
approaches’ (Foster et al., 2004, p. 22). 
The present research’s (Presence and Representation) discussion uses critical concepts and terms 
coming from the matrix of themes of Critical Theory. The elaboration and definition of these 
concepts assist  the evaluation and critique of the practical and experimental work, and vice versa. 
Critical Theory’s focus on language, symbolism and communication is consistent with the act of 
representation as a consequence of a presence (re-presentation). In this context, representation 
constitutes both an element of the apparatus of cognition and a practical/material manifestation.
Generally speaking, different historical conceptions of the act/process of representation correspond 
to different methodological approaches to it, and the other way  around. Accordingly, different 
necessities are reflected within the process of representation and, in my view, they can be 
illuminated by the exploration of the different approaches – usually concordant or polemic/
opponent – to the main theoretical field, the cantus firmus, of Metaphysics.
i
2. The traditional concept of representation 
All the arts, without exception, are “imitative”: the work of art can only be judged as such […] by the 
degree to which the model has been correctly represented; the beauty of the work is proportionate to 
its accuracy (!"#$%&' = “integritas sive perfectio”), or truth (()*#+,- = veritas). In other words, the 
artist’s judgement of his own work by the criterion of art  is a criticism based upon the proportion of 
essential to actual form, paradigm to image. [...] The “imitation” (µ.µ&/,') or “representation” of a 
model (even a “presented” model) involves, indeed, a “likeness” (0µ1,-, similitudo, Skr. s2dr3ya), but 
hardly what we usually mean by “verisimilitude” (4µ15%&'). What  is traditionally meant by “likeness” 
is not  a copy but  an “image” akin (/677+8*') and “equal” (9/1') to its model, in other words a natural 
and ad-equate symbol of its referent. (Coomaraswamy, 1981, p. 16).
The origin of the idea of “representation” and “likeness” can be traced back to before the discovery 
of writing (see Flusser, 2001, p. 23), i.e., before history, to the unconscious, perpetual magical 
circles of prehistoric thinking – to the figurative, visual, imaginative epoch and its ways. An 
example of the way of knowing by “likeness” can be found in the Empedoclean verses,
We see earth by earth, water by water
Bright aether by aether, and obliterating fire by fire
Love by love, and strife by baneful strife.
(Empedocles, fragment 109, in Aristotle’s De anima, 404b12-15)
Aristotle in mentioning the Empedoclean verses elaborates the idea that perception and knowledge 
require a likeness of composition between the subject and the object of cognition.
Furthermore, it has been discussed by scholars that the mythological prototype of representational 
artistic practice is Narcissus (Danto, 2004, p. 32). Initially, in the narration of the myth, Narcissus 
didn’t know that the object of his love was his self (cf. Lacan’s mirror stage). In truth, what he fell 
in love with was his reflected image on the mirror-like transparent waters of a fountain, a natural 
mirror... 
3. Semiotics and representation 
The matrix of semiotical analysis and structure is often used when trying to understand the 
formations and functions of cultural representation (Foster et al., 2004, p. 22). As Arthur Asa Berger 
(1991, p. 5) explains, ‘the essential breakthrough of semiology  is to take linguistics as a model and 
apply linguistic concepts to other phenomena – texts1 – and not just language itself.’
In semiotics, a sign can be a word, a sound, or a visual image, and researchers operating in this field 
aim to ‘generate a verifiable understanding of the processes of aesthetic production and reception,’ 
promising ‘to anchor the “meaning” of the work of art’ according to ‘the operations of the 
conventions of language’ (Foster et al., 2004, p. 22). Subsequently, semiology offers a methodology 
operating in the field of artistic research. An important issue in this context is to examine ‘the 
methodological conviction of certain models of analysis [that] has been just as overdetermined as 
that of all the other methodological models that have temporarily governed the interpretation and 
the writing of art history at different points in the twentieth century’(Foster et al., 2004, p. 22). 
ii
1 Structural criticism established the term text as any object that can be “read”, whether this object is a work of 
literature, a street sign, an arrangement of buildings on a city block, or styles of clothing.
Given that semiotics involves ‘studying representations and the processes involved in 
representational practices’, and that ‘to semioticians, “reality” always involves 
representation’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3), its definition can be compared with and conceived as a 
paraphrase of the traditionalistic description of mimesis, that has been presented in the previous 
chapter. Additionally, Charles Sanders Pierce suggested that reality can only be known via signs. ‘If 
representations are our only access to reality, determining their accuracy is a critical 
issue’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3). 
Assessing and posing questions about the representational accuracy and its necessity constitutes 
part of my research’s theoretical and practical interests,2 whilst  being, at the same time, an element 
of its subject matter. The specification of this project’s area of study  and methodology also 
corresponds to Saussure’s estimation that ‘In most scientific disciplines the “objects of study” 
were “given in advance” and existed independently of the observer’s “point of view”. [...] In 
linguistics, by contrast, “it is the viewpoint adopted which creates the object”’ (Chandler, 1994, 
ch. 3). Art practice and theory, unavoidably, calls for an adoption of such a viewpoint/thesis. 3
Of theoretical and practical interest is also Daniel Chandler’s statements concerning the 
representational accuracy theme. Specifically, he indicates that ‘Pierce adopted from logic the 
notion of “modality” to refer to the truth value of a sign, acknowledging three kinds: actuality, 
(logical) necessity and (hypothetical) possibility,’ and that ‘Modality refers to the reality status 
accorded to or claimed by a sign, text or genre’ (1994, ch. 3).
My overall aspiration to reexamine the constitution of the notion of the real, the process of 
representation and the interrelated spatiotemporal dynamics of presence is also to be seen within 
the text of the social semiotic theory of truth, which ‘cannot claim to establish the absolute truth or 
untruth of representations. It can only show whether a given “proposition” is represented as true or 
not. From the point of view of social semiotics, truth is a construct of semiosis, and as such the truth 
of a particular social group, arising from the values and beliefs of that group’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 
3). 
The consideration of the reality principle4  is intrinsic to the proposed research on Presence and 
Representation, as ‘any representation is more than merely a reproduction of that which it 
represents: it also contributes to the construction of reality’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3). The above 
notion raises hierarchical questions – i.e., the vast  discussion and argumentation about the primacy 
of the signifier or the signified, or the signature, or the trace – concerning which idea precedes, in 
what succession and how they are interrelated.5 
One of the ways in which my inquiry on Presence and Representation could possibly  contribute to 
the relevant theoretical and practical fields may be that it tests the preconception, the attitude and 
the approach towards the work of art before, during and after its production. The importance of this 
enterprise may be understood if one reflects on the consequences of a possible situation where the 
distinction of the real and the copy  has ceased to be visible. ‘The confusion of the representation 
iii
2 cf. the modality notion later in the text and the Polyptych IV artwork.
3 cf. Heidegger’s elaboration of what is a thesis.
4 The concept of the reality principle comes from Sigmund Freud and his introductory lectures.
5 cf. Agamben, 2009, p. 65, for an attempt to link the doctrine of signatures to ontology.
with the thing represented is a feature of schizophrenia and psychosis’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3; 
Wilden, 1987, p. 201). 
In light of the above, it is acknowledged that between the signifier and the signified a flexible 
modality  exists. Yet, even an image is not what it represents – the presence of an image marks the 
absence of its referent.6 
Historically, only after the seventeenth century ‘clear distinctions were being made between 
representations (signifiers), ideas (signifieds) and things (referents)’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3). 
Pragmatistic or idealistic approaches put  an emphasis on the signifier or the signified respectively. 
Furthermore, “subjective” comprehensions of the sign-function promote the idea that ‘reality is 
purely  subjective and is constructed in our use of signs’, whereas “objective” comprehensions hold 
that ‘a single objective reality exists indisputably outside us’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3).
4. Quodlibet7 – the theory of signatures
At a certain point, Michel Foucault  distinguishes ‘semiology – the set of knowledges that allow us 
to recognize what is a sign and what is not – from hermeneutics, which consists of the set of 
knowledges that allow us to discover the meaning of signs, to “make the signs speak”’(Agamben, 
2009a, p. 58). Enzo Melandri and Foucault revive the Paracelsean episteme8 and associate episteme 
with signatures; ‘the type of episteme depends on the type of signature’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 59). 
In this context, ‘a signature is a sort  of a sign within the sign; it is the index that in the context of a 
given semiology univocally makes reference to a given interpretation. A signature adheres to the 
sign in the sense that it indicates, by means of the sign’s making, the code with which it has to be 
deciphered’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 59). 
It is described that ‘the semiotic (the sign [semiology]) must be recognized; the semantic (discourse 
[hermeneutics]) must be understood.’ According to Melandri and Foucault, we must ‘situate 
signatures precisely in the “gap”’ that separates semiology from hermeneutics. In other words, 
‘signs do not speak unless signatures make them speak’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 61). 
 
If ‘“reality” always involves representation’, an analysis of the signature concept (what afterwards 
Foucault analyzed as “statement”, as bearer of efficacy) casts new light to the process of 
representation, placing a third principle of “cohesion – segregation”9  in the dualistic operation of 
signification (=representation).
 
Statement/Signature ‘is not in itself a unit, but a function that cuts across a domain of structures and 
possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space’ (Agamben, 
iv
6 This is the dialectics of the Polyptychs I, II, III through their serialism and their compositional arrangement as a trace.
7 ‘“Quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum”: every being presents the signature of unity (which directs it toward 
mathematics or the theory of singularity), of truth (which orients it toward the theory of knowledge), and of the good 
(which makes it communicable and desirable)’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 66).
8 At the original core of the paracelsian episteme lies the idea that all things bear a sign which manifests and reveals 
their invisible qualities. ‘Nothing is without a sign’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 33).
9 A similar notion can be traced back to the ancient notion of the Empedoclean “Love” (:,)$%&') and “Strife” (8+.;1').
2009a, p. 63). The scope of examination points to a different methodological approach; ‘to question 
language [including visual language, as previously stated] not in the direction to which it refers, 
but in the dimension that gives it’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 63). Signatures, in the broad context of 
cultural representation, ‘mark and “characterize”10  signs at the level of their existence11  , thus 
actualizing and displacing their efficacy’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 64).
 
The existential character of the signature/statement suggestion poses it at a state beyond concept, as 
‘being is not a concept but a signature. Hence, ontology is not a determinate knowledge but the 
archaeology  of every knowledge, which explores the signatures that  pertain to beings by  virtue of 
the very fact of existing, thus predisposing them to the interpretation of specific 
knowledges’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 66).
A question that can be raised at this point is whether such an approach is to be considered before 
any formation of an epistemological methodology. 
5. Reprise 
‘In most scientific disciplines the “objects of study” were “given in advance” and existed 
independently of the observer’s “point of view”. [...] In linguistics, by contrast, “it is the 
viewpoint adopted which creates the object.”’
6. Modulatio
Walter Benjamin, when dealing with the subject of mimesis, pointed at a transcendental area of 
understanding the sign: the area of the symbol. Carl Gustav Jung described that a word or an image 
is symbolic ‘when it implies something more than its obvious and immediate meaning. It has a 
wider “unconscious” aspect that is never precisely defined or fully  explained. Nor can one hope to 
define or explain it. As the mind explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of 
reason’ (Jung, 1968, p. 4). 
From this perspective, ‘language – as well as writing – appears as a sort of “archive of non-
sensuous similarities, of non-sensuous correspondences”, which ground and articulate “the ties not 
only between what is said and what is meant but also between what is written and what is meant, 
and equally between the spoken and the written”’(Agamben, 2009a, p. 70).
Similarly, Benjamin’s following fragment posits the nexus of meaning of words or sentences: 
The mimetic element in language can, like a flame, manifest  itself only through a kind of bearer. This 
bearer is the semiotic element. Thus, the nexus of meaning of words or sentences is the bearer through 
which, like a flash, similarity appears. For its production by man – like its perception by him – is in 
many cases, and particularly the most  important, tied to its flashing up. It  flits past. (Agamben, 2009a, 
p. 71) 
v
10 cf. Flusser for the etymological relation of character with the Greek 7"<:=/>-"<//=.
11 For the contrary cp. the Derridean accusation of logocentrism – i.e., the dialectics of presence – and the described 
further down on this report essence, or energy, of graphein (=7"<:=) as the originary effacement of the proper name.
This description is also of practical interest for the present research, justifying the adoption of the 
polyptych compositional arrangement and its gap cohesion.
Further on, Benjamin establishes an unavoidable determinant, that  of immaterial similarity, which 
‘functions as an irreducible complement to the semiotic element of language without which the 
transition to discourse cannot be understood’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 72).
The vicissitudes of Schein and the problematic of light in Gerhard Richter’s art practice,12 as I have 
described at  length in the corresponding section of this report, run in parallel with Benjamin’s 
description of flash (i.e., image, signature): 
“For the historical index of the images not  only says that they belong to a particular time; it says, 
above all, that they attain to legibility only at a particular time. [...] Every present day is determined by 
the images  that are synchronic with it: each “now” [jetzt] is the now of a particular 
recognizability.13 [...] It  is not that  what is past casts its light on what  is present, or what  is present  its 
light on what  is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the 
now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill”. (Agamben, 2009a, p. 
72).
The above statement, in which Benjamin refers to “a particular recognizability”, is significant for 
the consideration of the position of the art  project (as a historical object) in space–time conditions 
intrinsic to the process of its production – the formation of a viewpoint: ‘The historical object is 
never given neutrally; rather, it is always accompanied by an index or signature that constitutes it as 
image and temporally determines and conditions its legibility’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 73).
Fashion is ‘where signatures exhibit their genuinely historical character’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 72). 
In fashion’s operation Benjamin’s synchronic images are exemplified.14  In this operation, as a 
caesura in time, 
The signature of Fashion tears the years (the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s) out of linear chronology, 
allowing them to have a special relation with the designer’s gesture, who cites them to make them 
appear in the incalculable “now” of the present. Yet this present is in itself ungraspable, since it lives 
only in kairological (not chronological) relation to the signatures of the past. (Agamben, 2009a, p. 74)
An anadiplosis of this proposition can be found within the term critical theory (from krisis/;"./,'15) 
(the theory on which this report  is sustained), that is glossologicaly connected with the etymology 
of the words krisis (;"./,'), as separation, disaggregation, resolution, distinction, and kairos 
vi
12 Gerhard Richter has stated that ‘the central problem in my work is light’ (cf. Hal Foster, 2003, pp. 126-127).
13 I also suggest an interpretation of this recognizability in light of Jaques Lacan’s concept of the mirror stage.
14 cf. Giorgio Agamben’s treatise What is an apparatus? on synchronic, as well as Agamben, 1999, p. 72.
15 !"#$%&:
 I. a separating, power of distinguishing
 II. a decision, judgment, in legal sense, a triala dispute
 III. the event or issue of a thing.
(Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English lexicon, at www.perseus.tufts.edu) 
(;-,"$'16), as congruous space and time (from kera- notion of proximate unity/articulation, 
according to Stamatakos Dictionary, p. 484). 
This terminology, in turn, calls to mind the signature principle of “cohesion – segregation”, without 
which, or in its lack of distinction, the ‘worst kind of subversion’ is taking place. ‘It is against this 
lack of distinction that classical reason armed itself in all its categories. But it is what today again 
outflanks them, submerging the principle of truth’ (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 4).
7. 0
An important schema in the contextualization of Presence and Representation – or Representation 
and Presence, which makes no difference, according to the following description– links back to the 
discussion on the primacy/dominance of the Saussurean dipole “signifier – signified”. ‘The non-
marked term is not opposed to the marked term as an absence is to presence, but rather that non-
presence is somehow equivalent to a zero degree of presence (that presence is lacking in its 
absence)’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 77).
 
In Giorgio Agamben’s analysis (2009a, p. 78), ‘the zero degree is not a sign, but a signature that, in 
the absence of a signified, continues to operate as the exigency of an infinite signification that 
cannot be exhausted by any signified.’ Furthermore, the introduction of an “empty” or “floating” 
signifier as a product of the primacy  of the signifier runs its course in the ontological consideration 
of zero, or the void – ‘the ontological stopping point of number’ (Badiou, 2008, p. 7). 
The doctrine of the empty, void, zero signifier – ‘a sign [that] only  means that it means’ (Chandler, 
1994, p. 12) – is associated to ‘non-linguistic signs [...such as paintings or sculptures] as being so 
open to interpretation [hermeneutics], that they constituted a floating chain of signifieds’ (Chandler, 
1994, ch. 3; Barthes, 1957). 
In contrast, Heidegger’s approach posits “under erasure” a primacy on a transcendental/
preconceived signified, Being (thus having the priority), ‘which seems not to tolerate any 
determinations other than the “neither...nor” of negative theology’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 66). ‘This 
is to write a word, cross it out, and then print both word and deletion. (Since the word is inaccurate, 
it is crossed out. Since it is necessary, it remains legible)’ (Derrida, 1997, p. xiv).
‘The sign is that ill-named thing... which escapes the instituting question of 
philosophy...’ (Derrida, 1997, p. 19).
vii
16 !'%"(&:
I. due measure, proportion, fitness 
 II. of Place, vital part of the body
 III. more freq. of Time, exact or critical time, season, opportunity
  2. season
   b. critical times, periodic states
  3. generally, time, period
  4. in pl., 1, ;-,"1., the times, i. e. the state of affairs
 IV. advantage, profit
V. Pythag. name for seven, Theol.Ar. 44.
(Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English lexicon, at www.perseus.tufts.edu)
8. Jacques Derrida
For Derrida, presence and re-presentation (re-present: identify, resemble, simulate, imitate) belong 
to the logocentric dialectics/attributes of metaphysics:
But to these  metaphysico-theological  roots many other hidden sediments cling. The  semiological 
or, more specifically, linguistic “science” cannot therefore  hold on to the difference  between 
signifier and signified – the  very idea of the sign – without the difference  between sensible  and 
intelligible, certainly, but also not without retaining, more profoundly and more  implicitly, and 
by the  same token the  reference to a signified able  to “take place” in its intelligibility, before its 
“fall”, before  any expulsion into the exteriority of the  sensible here  below. As the  face of pure 
intelligibility refers to an absolute logos to which it is immediately united. (Derrida, 1997, p.13)  
Derrida’s description is open in more than one ways, since he does not acknowledge any origin in a 
singular course (hierarchy), but, rather, he speaks of a gesture of a continuous displacement of 
meaning, in a ‘ceaseless differance that erases its own trace in a pure auto-signification’ (Agamben, 
2009a, p. 79). This non-conceptual “archi-trace”, as a “signature at degree zero” (Agamben, 2009a, 
p. 78), underlies every concept and every presence. ‘The trace is then a signature suspended and 
referred toward itself, a kenosis that never knows its own pleroma’ (Agamben, 2009a, p. 79).
In pictorial language, as well as in language in general, differance17  acts as a continuous and 
dynamic re-arrangement of pictorial elements that acquire their character in accordance to/
interaction with all the other elements of the composition18 (the con-text), and constitute and are 
constituted within a representational system that limits its space.19 
9. ( ) Parenthesis
According to Daniel Chandler, ‘Modality refers to the reality status accorded to or claimed by a 
sign, text20or genre’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3).
With reference to the approach of the modality as a qualitative or quantitative measurement of the 
“divergence – conversion” from a (“shifting”, in Derrida’s comprehension) reality principle, i.e., a 
kind of entropy 21, certain conclusions can be reached about how art practice research resists stable 
methodological approaches – ‘like a power of resistance that restrains an excessive entropy 
functions as a self-regulation apparatus providing an uplift of the organizational 
complexity’ (Arnheim, 1971, p. 13).
viii
17 Differance is a term coined by Jacques Derrida describing how the meaning of signs derives from how they differ 
from each other – a ‘meaning that is endlessly deferred’ (Chandler, 1994). Also cp. to Heraclitus quote ‘The unlike is 
joined together, and from differences results the most beautiful harmony’ (Fragment 46, in Aristoteles, Eth. Nic. viii. 2, 
translated by G.W.T. Patrick).
18 That description also entails the problem of the limits of the text’s expansion towards history.
19 When speaking about limitation, I am not referring only to the frame of the canvas (see also Klee’s compositions and 
Arnheim’s perception of the grapheme).
20 ‘Etymologically, the word text means a textile and the word line a linen thread. But texts are unfinished textiles; they 
consist of lines (the woof) and are not held in place by vertical threads (the warp) as a finished textile would 
be’ (Flusser, 2001, p. 37). See also the artworks Horizons I, II. 
21 The term entropy was coined in 1865 by Rudolf Clausius based on the Greek +8%"1?.- [entropía]: from +8- [en-] (in) 
and %"1?* [trop)] (turn, conversion), a turning toward a state of dis-order (Greek: -%-@.-).
The word information, taken literally, means to give form; and form needs structure. This is why the 
tempting prospect  of applying in-formation theory to the arts, and thereby reducing aesthetic form to 
quantitative measurement, has remained largely unrewarding. The more adequate the attempts to 
account for a sequence of items, e.g., in a piece of music by calculating the probability of its 
occurrence, the more necessary it is to consider complex structural factors; and this complexity of 
order tends to make the calculation impracticable. (Arnheim, 1971, p. 16)
Nonetheless, according to Vilem Flusser’s definition (2001, p. 12) ‘The more improbable, the 
more informative’, art is radically informative. 
Information is the mirror image of entropy, the reverse of the tendency of all objects (the objective 
world as a whole) to decay into more and more probable situations and finally into a formless, 
extremely probable22 situation. […] The gesture of informing characteristically expresses the intention 
of a subject to negate the objective tendency toward entropy. One informs (produces improbable 
situations) to set  spirit  against  material that tends, absurdly, toward heat death. Writing, like digging, 
presses this spirit into the object to inspire it, that is, to make it improbable. (Flusser, 2001, pp. 12-13) 
The previous description of in-formation seems to associate materialistic and idealistic theoretical 
attitudes towards signification at the meeting point of the traditional conception; the 
representational artistic manifestation of an idea.
A more practical application of Flusser’s conception of information is to be found during the 
process of artistic materialization of a project, where ‘by grasping and working objects, the writer 
realizes that the reverse of the tendency to decay is his resistance to the spirit  that wants to inform 
them: the better a memory is, the more laborious it is to dig into it (e.g., bronze or marble); the 
easier it is to dig into it (e.g., clay), the more quickly the information dug into it will 
disappear’(Flusser, 2001, p. 13).
By making modality judgements, i.e., trying to make sense of/interprete a text, one frequently finds 
himself (according to Jean Baudrillard’s one-dimensional virtual reality) in a “suspension of 
disbelief”, ‘without compromising [one’s] ability  to distinguish representations from 
reality’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3).
A gradation of modality cues exists; ‘writing, for instance, has a lower modality than 
film’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3), in which the gap between signifier and signified diminishes, making it 
seem to offer a “reflection of reality.” Additionally, ‘the power of language systems is that there is a 
very great difference between the signifier and the signified; the power of film is that there is 
not’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3). Consequently, the distinction between the real and the copy disappears.
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22 A further exploration of the relationship between probability, chance and freedom of will (‘inscription is an 
expression of free will’, Flusser, 2001, p. 14) is to be found in this paper’s chapters about Richter and Xenakis.
In General Semantics’ interpretation of the non-identity of sign and thing, an acceptance is 
sustained/embedded an acceptance that realities are structures which have authors and are thus 
capable to be evaluated and examined according to a level/degree of language’s participation to 
(descriptive capability of) reality, actually acknowledging a climax from concrete reality to abstract 
generalization, i.e., the levels of abstraction.23 ‘General semantics sought to avoid the confusion of 
higher logical types with lower logical types. A “map” is of a higher (more general) logical type 
than “the territory”, and linguistic representation in particular lends itself to this process of 
abstraction’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3).
Moreover, the previous statement carries along issues of translation and interpretation; such is the 
case with the particularly  abstract logos ()$71')  argued by  Derrida. ‘Understanding consists in 
the reduction of one type of reality to another’24 (Levi-Strauss, 1961; Chandler, 1994, ch. 3). Or, 
else, ‘Signification is [...] nothing but [...] transposition from one level of language to another, from 
one language to a different language, and meaning is nothing but the possibility  of such 
transcoding’25 (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3).
x
23 The problematics of this terminology is discussed in the chapter about Bacon.
24 In my multi-layered polyptychs I am trying to explore the ways of such transposition in practice.
25 See this paper’s chapter about Hiller (the rhythm of languages, the meter), as well as Plato’s cave allegory. 
Formal features
• 3D – flat
• detailed – abstract
• coloured – monochrome
• edited – unedited
• moving – still
• audible – silent
Content features
• possible – impossible
• plausible – implausible
• familiar – unfamiliar
• current – distant in time
• local – distant in space
Figure 1
Cornelius Gijsbrechts, 1670
A cabinet of curiosities with an ivory tankard
(showing reverse of cupboard door)
oil on canvas, Statens Museum for Kunst
10. Ricercare 
Logos, traditionally, is spermatic (/?+"µ-%,;$') (an aporia is always schematized in relation with 
poros) – a generative principle of the universe. Its semantic field extends beyond “word”26.
Derrida objected that the metaphysical principle of logos and the interrelated metaphysics of 
presence were mistakenly  taken as the origin of speech – a fundamental philosophical presumption. 
Instead, he theorized that differance is always active as iterability, inscription, or textuality, 
producing ‘what metaphysics call the sign (signified/signifier). […] What defers presence [...] is the 
very basis on which presence is announced or desired in what represents it, its sign, its 
trace’ (Derrida, 2004, pp. 6-7).
It is crucial for the illustration of the aporia which is connected with the subject matter of Presence 
and Representation to further explore the synecdoches of Derrida’s thinking on presence (1997, p. 
12): 
... phonocentrism merges with the historical determination of the meaning of being in general as 
presence, with all the subdeterminations which depend on this general form and which organize within 
it their system and their historical sequence (presence of the thing to the sight as [eidos], presence as 
substance/essence/existence [ousia], temporal presence as point  [stigmè] of the now or the moment 
[nun], the self presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the other and of 
the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional phenomenon of the ego, and so forth). Logocentrism would 
thus support the determination of the being of the entity as presence.
For Carl Gustav Jung (1982, p. 65), logos represented the masculine principle of rationality, in 
contrast to its female counterpart, eros (the son of Poros and Penia [Penia = a-poria]): ‘Woman’s 
psychology is founded on the principle of Eros, the great binder and loosener, whereas from ancient 
times the ruling principle ascribed to man is Logos. The concept of Eros could be expressed in 
xi
26 (A) the word or that by which the inward thought is expressed, Lat. oratio; and (B) the inward thought itself, Lat. 
ratio.
A. Lat. vox, oratio: that which is said or spoken
I. a word, pl. words, i.e., language, talk
II. a word, saying, statement
2. an assertion, promise
3. a resolution
4. a condition
5. a command
III. speech, discourse, conversation
2. right of speech, power to speak
3. talk about one, report, repute, Lat. fama 
4. speech, language
IV. a saying, tale, story, opp. on the one hand, to mere fable (µA#1'), on the other, to regular history (,/%1".-)
2. a narrative, and in pl. histories, history
V. generally, prose-writing, prose
VI. a speech, oration
VII. like "*µ', the thing spoken of, the subject or matter of the +(,-&, attic
VIII. that which is stated, a proposition, position, principle: also = -"%$µ(&, a definition
B. Lat. ratio: thought, reason
2. an opinion, expectation
3. a reason, ground, plea
4. - +(,-& '%"./%, c. acc. et inf., it stands to reason that…, Lat. ratio evincit, Hdt.
II. account, consideration, esteem, regard 
III. due relation, proportion, analogy
C. 0 1O203, the Logos or Word, comprising both senses of Thought and Word.
(Liddell and Scott, An intermediate Greek-English lexicon, at www.perseus.tufts.edu)
Also, from the etymological root )+>-: the )B>-1', )+>-5, (i.e., puerperal,  put sb to bed) (Stamatakou lexicon, pp. 571, 
576).
modern terms as psychic relatedness, and that of Logos as objective interest.’ The animus 
compensates eros, while the anima compensates logos27 (Papadopoulos, 2006).
A consistent application of Derrida’s teachings in the present research would be to consider a 
completely different  form of editing and presentation, examining a subject area that is itself always 
in change and in flux28, i.e., an open compositional arrangement and elaboration (like a palimpsest 
or a multi-layered polyptych). Such a case would also be the neutralizing of oppositions and 
hierarchy: ‘It is not enough “simply  to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must 
recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent  hierarchy. 
One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. 
To deconstruct the opposition is first [...] to overthrow the hierarchy”’ (Derrida, 1997, p. lxxvi). 
Consequently, meaning is endlessly deferred, an ‘indefinite referral of signifier to 
signified’ (Chandler, 1994, p. 12; Derrida, 1978, p. 25). ‘This differance – being the structure (a 
structure never quite there, never by us perceived, itself deferred and different) of our psyche – is 
also the structure of “presence”, a term itself under erasure [presence]. For differance, producing 
the differential structure of our hold on “presence”, never produces presence as such’ (Derrida, 
1997, p. xliii).
And, in a complementary mode, ‘In Roland Barthes’s words: “... to find in it  [the object] certain 
mobile fragments whose differential situation engenders a certain meaning; the fragment has no 
meaning in itself, but it is nonetheless such that the slightest variation wrought in its configuration 
produces a change in the whole”’ (Derrida, 1997, p. lv). An analogy of such dynamics is to be found 
in the pictorial process of configuring schemes, colours, lines, etc.29
11. Metaphor
An interrogation concerning the process of representation denotes the work of art as a metaphor 
(allegory, representation) that, for Friedrich Nietzsche, is the originary process of what the intellect 
presents as “truth.” 
The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, develops its chief power in 
dissimulation […] “A nerve-stimulus, first transcribed [ubertragen] into an image [Bild]! First 
metaphor! The image again copied into a sound! Second metaphor! And each time he [the creator of 
language] leaps completely out of one sphere right  into the midst  of an entirely different one” […] 
Nietzsche’s definition of metaphor seems to be the establishing of an identity between dissimilar 
things.30 (Derrida, 1997, p. xxii)
The transition from metaphor to symbol demonstrates that ‘at  symbol, relations are indistinct, 
because they are not clearly  assembled, structured, articulated [4%5"6"7$%&] at the logical level. […] 
[The symbol] rather assimilates ['8-µ-#7$%&] than arrests logically  a semblance/likeness’ (Ricoeur, 
2002, p. 63).
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27 cf. Derrida, Of grammatology, p. lxv.
28 A parallelism of it is the perception of concepts as subtle colours that are always subjected to the dynamics, 
potentiality and energy of light ! viewpoint.
29 Cf. my artwork Sea, the gestalt psychology, Paul Klee’s Notebooks.
30 Cf. the statement that ‘true metaphors are untranslatable’ (Ricoeur, 2002, p. 57).
 
‘Interpretation is “the introduction of meaning” (or “deception through meaning” – 
Sinnhineinlegen), a making-sign that is a making-figure, for there is, in this thought, no possibility 
of a literal, true, self-identical meaning. Identification (Gleich-machen) constitutes the act of 
figuration’ (Derrida, 1997, p. xxiii).
According to Jacques Lacan, the constitution of the subject takes place within the play of metaphors 
and their deferment: 
[...] a “subject” [...] can never be a “total personality,” the “exercise of whose function” is to be forever 
divided from the object of its desire (Lacan computes the structural relationships among need, demand 
for love, and desire), and to constitute itself in the distortive play of metaphor and metonymy – 
displacement and condensation – that forever distances the other, the object  of its desire, from itself. 
(Derrida, 1997, p. lxii)
Translative economical loss31, i.e., the loss of “literary” meaning (see the next paragraph about the 
proper name), when, for example, translators ‘obliterated the word “pharmakon” by providing a 
collection of different words as its translated substitute’, is, for Derrida (1997, p. lxxxvii), ‘an 
effective deconstructive tool.’32 Furthermore, it ‘is not [...] a matter of inverting the literal meaning 
and the figurative meaning but of determining the “literal” meaning of writing as metaphoricity 
itself’ (Derrida, 1997, p. 15). 
For Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Derrida’s chief concern might be summarized thus: to 
problematize the proper name and proper (literal) meaning, the proper in general. […] The 
argument points also to the theme of the play of desire around the proper name: The narcissistic 
desire33  to make one’s own “proper” name34 “common”, to make it enter and be at one with the 
body of the mother-tongue; and, at the same time, the oedipal desire to preserve one’s proper name, 
to see it as the analogon of the name of the father’35 (Derrida, 1997, p. lxxxiv).
Thus the name, especially the so-called proper name, is always caught in a chain or a system of 
differences. It becomes an appellation only to the extent that it may inscribe  itself within a 
figuration. Whether it be  linked by its origin to the representations of things in space  or whether 
it remains caught in a system of phonic differences or social  classifications apparently released 
from ordinary space, the proper-ness of the  name  does not escape  spacing. Metaphor shapes and 
undermines the  proper name. The literal [propre] meaning does not exist, its “appearance” is a 
necessary function  – and must be  analyzed as such – in  the  systems of differences and 
metaphors. The  absolute parousia of the  literal meaning, as the presence to the self of the logos 
within its voice, in the  absolute hearing-itself-speak, should be  situated as a function responding 
to an indestructible but relative  necessity, within  a system that encompasses  it. That amounts  to 
situating the metaphysics or the ontotheology of logos. (Derrida, 1997, p. 89) 
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31 ‘“If you augment language by one sign,” Saussure said, “you diminish in the same proportion the [value] of the 
others”’ (Foster et al., 2004, p. 37).
32 In my opinion, this example clearly points to a fundamental policy strategy.
33 Cf. the previously mentioned quotation of Danto. 
34 Cf. the signature/character debate, the Levi-Strauss narration mentioned in Of grammatology, and the magic beliefs 
related with language.
35 Cf. Castoriadis’ discussion about the “prostitution” of words. 
12. Epilogue like a prologue
Engaging art practice is a process which intrinsically infers to ‘a text [that] has as many meanings 
as it has readers’ (Flusser, 2001, p. 37). The compositional format of my polyptychs36  descends 
from such an attitude, that is considered practically and theoretically  open. Despite that openness, 
the notion of centrality/viewpoint is not in question, but it is related to a subject that shifts in 
space–time.
[...] What is a lineage in the order of discourse and text? If in rather conventional way I call by the 
name of discourse the present, living, conscious representation of a text within the experience of the 
person who writes or reads it, and if the text constantly goes beyond this representation by the entire 
system of its resources and its own laws, then the question of genealogy exceeds by far the 
possibilities that are at  present  given for its elaboration. We know that  the metaphor that  would 
describe the genealogy of a text correctly is forbidden. In its syntax and its lexicon, in its spacing, by 
its punctuation, its lacunae, its margins, the historical appurtenance of a text is never a straight line. 
(Derrida, 1997, p. 101)
Practically, this strategy of elaboration and analysis points 
to a cyclicality, or self-reflexivity (-8-/%1>-/µ$' 
[anastochasmos])37, that is reiterated in Derrida’s cadenza 
(1997, p. 141): ‘We are dispossessed of the longed-for 
presence in the gesture of language by which we 
attempt to seize it.’ 
This modus can be directly applied in art practice in the 
same way as writing, for Derrida (1997, p. 9), describes the 
manner that we understand language; ‘we say  “writing” for 
all that gives rise to an inscription38 in general, whether it is 
literal or not and even if what it  distributes in space is alien 
to the order of the voice: cinematography, choreography, of 
course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptural “writing”.’ 
A semiotical examination is exemplified in the prologue of 
the book Art since 1900, where Yves-Alain Bois surveys 
Piet Mondrian’s work (see Figure 2), who had ‘limited the 
corpus of possible pictorial marks within his system, but 
th is very l imi ta t ion immensely accrued thei r 
“value”’ (Foster et al., 2004, p. 38). For Roland Barthes, ‘permutation and combination are the 
means by  which any discourse is generated and as such they constitute the two main aspects of what 
[is] called the “structuralist activity”. In these two canvases, Mondrian checks, just as a scientist 
would do, if and how our perception of a central square changes according to the modifications of 
its surroundings’ (Foster et al., 2004, p. 39).
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36 Cf. Foster, 2004, p. 46.
37 The archetype of this process is Ouroboros, an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail. It 
comes from the Greek words 1C"< [ourá], meaning “tail”, and D$"1' [boros], meaning “eating”, thus “he who eats his 
tail”.
38 Cf. Vilém Flusser’s Does writing have a future?.
Figure 2
Piet Mondrian, 1922,
Composition with blue, 
black, yellow, and red, 
oil on canvas, 39.5 x 34.7 cm
In this chapter, which is dedicated to the theoretical context of my research, a choice of some key 
ideas that elucidate the development of my art practice have been presented. This cadenza-like 
choice of presentation is in synch but distinct from the Derridean trace dictum, according to which 
‘The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense39 in general. Which amounts to saying once again 
that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is the differance which opens 
appearance [l’apparaitre] and signification’ (Derrida, 1997, p. 65). 
In contrast to this negation of absolute origin is the conception of signification not by  means of a 
sign but  by means of a symbol.40 ‘The Center is before all else the origin, the point of departure of 
all things; it  is the principial point, without form, without dimensions, therefore indivisible, and 
consequently the only image that can be given to primordial Unity’ (Guénon, 2001, p. 57).
The social consequences emanating from the different comprehensions of presence, representation 
and the real are reflections of different viewpoints and theses; ‘[...] reality does not exist 
independently of signs, turning our critical attention to the issue of whose realities are privileged in 
particular representations – a perspective which, avoiding a retreat to subjectivism, pays due tribute 
to the unequal distribution of power in the social world’ (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3). 
This differentiation of viewpoint towards the sign (i.e., simulacra) has been condensed by Jean 
Baudrillard in three forms:
• counterfeit (imitation) – ‘when there was still a direct link between signifiers and their 
signifieds;’
• production (illusion) – ‘when there was an indirect link between signifier and signified;’
• simulation (fake) – ‘when signifiers came to stand in relation only to other signifiers and not 
in relation to any fixed external [?] reality’41 (Chandler, 1994, ch. 3).
According to Baudrillard, the successive phases of the image42 are the following:
1. It is the reflection of a basic reality.
2. It masks and perverts a basic reality.
3. It masks the absence of a basic reality.
4. It bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum.43 (Baudrillard, 
1998, p. 170).
On the whole, my personal stance on the subject matter is attuned to Giorgio Agamben’s analysis, 
and especially to his viewpoint (1999, p. 101) according to which ‘Man has on earth a poetic status, 
because it is poiesis that founds for him the original space of his world.’ 
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39 Cf. some of Gilles Deleuze’s ideas discussed in the correspondent chapter (2.1.).
40 Cf. the previously cited description by Carl Gustav Jung.
41 Cf. Baudrillard’s interpretation (1994) of ‘representations as a means of concealing the absence of reality’ (i.e., the 
simulacra).
42 I present Baudrillard’s observations about painting in detail in this report’s chapters about Richter.
43 Cf. the -?+.;-/µ-, Foster, 2004.
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Polyptych II (detail), 2009
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Polyptych II (detail), 2009
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Polyptych II (detail), 2009
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Paul Klee , 1920, the watermill example of the function of pictorial language, 
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Work in progress: an early stage of the Polyptych London 80 x 405 cm   
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Polyptych III, acrylic gouache, wood, perspex, carving on wood,
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Image 27
Polyptych III, acrylic gouache, wood, perspex, carving 
on wood, 80 x 80 x 10.5 cm, (width x height x depth) 
Image 28
Details of Polyptych III, acrylic gouache, wood, perspex, carving on wood
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Detail of Polyptych III, acrylic gouache, wood, perspex, carving on wood
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Polyptych IV, 2011, plaster, paper, digital colour print, 
5 pieces, 20 x 20 x <10 cm
Image 32
The printed and cut papers for the Polyptych IV, 
5, 4.5, 4, 3.5, 3 cm
Image 33
The five units of the Polyptych IV made of molded paper 
(paper, acrylic adhesive), 20 x 20 cm 
Image 34
Polyptych IV, 2011, plaster, paper, digital colour print, 20 x 20 x <10 cm
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Polyptych IV, 2011, plaster, paper, digital colour print, 20 x 20 x <10 cm
Image 36
Polyptych V, 2011, in situ installation, wooden construction, digital printing 
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Polyptych IV, 2011, plaster, 
paper, digital colour print, 
20 x 20 x <10 cm
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Image 38
7 Vessels, 2011, glass vessels, water, acrylic paint, each vessel 12 cm
Image 39
7 Bells, 2011, iron, the bigger bell approximately: 18 x 17 x 7 cm
Image 40
Pebbles, 2011, pebbles, A4 pebble-text arrangement
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Horizons 1, 2011, wood, carpet, acrylic paint, varnish, 160 cm x 68 cm x 3
Image 42
Horizons II, 2011, acrylic paint, iron, car paint, carpet, 150 cm x 91 cm x 3
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Details of Horizons II, 2011, 
acrylic paint on carpet
Im
age 44
Polyptych VI, 2012, oil on w
ood, 40 x 40 x 1 cm
 (w
ork in progress)
Im
age 45
Polyptych VI, 2012, oil on w
ood, 40 x 40 x 1 cm
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ork in progress)
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Polyptych VI, 2012, oil on w
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ork in progress)
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Polyptych VI, 2012, oil on w
ood, 40 x 40 x 1 cm
 (w
ork in progress)
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Polyptych VI, 2012, oil on w
ood, 40 x 40 x 1 cm
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ork in progress)
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Polyptych VI, 2012, oil on w
ood, 30 x 30 x 10 cm
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ork in progress)
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Polyptych VI, 2012, oil on w
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ork in progress)
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Polyptych VII, 2012, oil on w
ood, 12 pieces 40 x 40 x 1 cm
 and 2 pieces 20 x 20 x 1 cm
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Views of the 2012 D.F.A final exhibition in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements of the School of Arts and Digital Industries
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Polyptych VIII, 2012, plaster, oil colour, 40 x 40 x  <
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Polyptych VIII, 2012, plaster, oil colour, 40 x 40 x  <
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